Making monetary policy: Caution, conservatism and the public supply of liquidity. by Schellekens, Philip
MAKING MONETARY POLICY: 
CAUTION, CONSERVATISM AND 
THE PUBLIC SUPPLY OF LIQUIDITY
by
P h ilip  S c h e l l e k e n s  
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of
D octor of Philosophy 
at the University of London
UMI Number: U143029
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U143029
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
SF
7760
ABSTRACT
This dissertation offers two perspectives on the making of monetary policy under 
uncertainty. The first two chapters examine the consequences of uncertainty for the 
macroeconomic function of the central bank - the stabilisation of macroeconomic 
variables of interest around socially desirable targets. The third chapter examines 
the consequences of uncertainty for the central bank’s microeconomic function - the 
public supply of liquidity.
The first chapter asks whether society benefits from the delegation of 
monetary policy to cautious and conservative central bankers. We offer a critical 
view on the delegation literature and relax seemingly innocuous assumptions about 
uncertainty and preferences. First, caution improves credibility but does not obviate 
the need for central-bank conservatism. Second, previous models of delegation 
have focused on suboptimal forms of conservatism. We derive optimal concepts of 
conservatism that mitigate, or eliminate, any residual problem of credibility. Third, 
we rationalize why credible monetary policy may be conducive to stable inflation and 
output.
The second chapter examines the implications of instrument uncertainty for 
optimal monetary policy following the introduction of non-quadratic preferences. We
investigate both symmetric and asymmetric preferences and discuss the consequences 
for caution, gradualism and the optimal delegation of monetary policy.
The third chapter examines the microeconomic role of the central bank. We 
develop a rationale for the provision of public liquidity based on an incomplete 
contracting framework. The model illustrates to what extent wealth-constrained 
entrepreneurs are leveraged by collateralized debt contracts and examines the 
consequences of costly collateral liquidation and aggregate asset price uncertainty 
for the provision of external finance.
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INTRODUCTION
“Everything is vague to a degree you do not realize till you have tried to 
make it precise(B ertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism)
Uncertainty about the world we live in has always been a good source for discussion 
and differences of opinion. In the field of central banking, matters are no different. 
Consider, for example, the ongoing debate on whether money matters, whether 
monetary institutions matter and, more recently, whether inflation isn’t dead after 
ail. Uncertainty - an elegant metaphor for our lack of understanding - is a paramount 
feature of the world the policy maker fives in.
Uncertainty is both a challenge and an opportunity. A challenge, because 
uncertainty complicates the implementation of policy, given a set of well-specified 
objectives. An opportunity, because uncertainty may create a rationale for policy, 
legitimizing a particular set of objectives. The role and implementation of monetary 
policy under uncertainty is the central theme of this thesis.
Traditionally, the functional repertoire of a central bank has been categorised 
into a macroeconomic objective (namely the stabilisation of variables of interest - 
such as inflation and output - around socially desirable targets) and a microeconomic 
objective (namely the provision of liquidity to safeguard the health of the financial
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system). Following this traditional distinction, the thesis offers two perspectives on 
the consequences of uncertainty for the making of monetary policy.
At the macroeconomic level, we examine how uncertainty interferes with 
the implementation of macroeconomic objectives. The type of uncertainty that 
we consider here is instrument uncertainty, which disturbs the transmission of a 
given stance of monetary policy. The issues that we examine in this context axe 
twofold. First, in relation to the conduct of monetary policy, we study how instrument 
uncertainty gives rise to caution and gradualism in the setting of the policy maker’s 
instrument. (‘Caution’ here refers to a tendency to adopt more neutral policies; 
‘gradualism’ reflects a tendency to smooth an instantaneous policy adjustment into 
smaller ones over time.) Second, in relation to the design of monetary policy, we 
study how instrument uncertainty interacts with the delegation of monetary policy 
to individuals with socially unrepresentative preferences. We explore various notions 
of central-bank conservatism and show how the consequences of uncertainty become 
endogenous to the policy regime. These issues form the subject of Chapters 1 and 2.
At the microeconomic level, we examine how uncertainty may legitimize 
a rationale for policy, more specifically a role for the public supply of liquidity 
to the banking system. The environment that we study here features aggregate 
asset price uncertainty. We show how aggregate uncertainty disrupts the feasibility 
of contractual arrangements between banks and entrepreneurs who are wealth- 
constrained. Furthermore, we look into the desirability of interest rate smoothing
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and the likelihood of currency crises in economies that lack sufficient financial 
development. These issues form the subject of Chapter 3.
It is useful to briefly motivate how each individual chapter fits into the thesis 
as a whole. For the discussion of related literature we refer to the introduction of 
each chapter.
CH A PTER  ONE
The first chapter, titled ‘Caution and Conservatism in the Making of Monetary 
Policy \ takes the following question as a starting point: Does society benefit from 
the delegation of monetary policy to cautious and conservative central bankers? Our 
interest in this question is motivated by the following two observations.
First, as Mervyn King pointed out in a recent talk, “non-economists will 
always point to the dangers of delegating decisions to the so-called experts... And 
the cult of the amateur is still revered by many.”1 In relation to monetary policy,
1 On his appointment as Financial Secretary to the UK Treasury in the 1930s, Duff Cooper wrote: 
“I had feared that my limited acquaintance with political economy and my ignorance of finance 
would prove serious handicaps, but within a week of my appointment I had to wind-up a debate on 
currency in the House of Commons and, speaking without the slightest knowledge of the subject,
I was able, by drawing attention to the discrepancies in the remedies proposed by the previous 
speakers, all of them experts, to create a favourable opinion and to earn many congratulations.” 
(Quoted from King’s address to the joint luncheon of the American Economic Association and the 
American Finance Association at the Boston Marriott, 7 January 2000).
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the popular media continues to hold a perception that delegation to cautious and 
conservative central bankers is costly. At the same time, empirical economists have 
found that the delegation of monetary policy to central banks (with the alleged 
features) seems more like a free lunch, leading to lower inflation at no real costs. 
However, we do not yet have a theoretical understanding of how caution and 
conservatism can be reconciled with the free lunch result of delegation.2
Second, observers and practicioners in the field of central banking have 
repeatedly expressed their dissatisfaction about the lack of convergence between the 
theory and practice of monetary policy. The credibility literature of monetary policy 
and the delegation literature, in particular, have been the subject of much scrutiny 
recently. Alan Blinder forcefully suggests two exceptions in his celebrated book 
‘Central Banking in Theory and Practice’ when he reviews the issues where academics 
and policy makers have actually come together.3 The first is the so-called Brainard
2 Appraising the tension between public perceptions and policy optimality, Charles Goodhart 
concluded his Keynes Lecture at the British Academy (29 October 1998) by indicating that “there 
is an absolute yawning gap between the general perception of non-economist outsiders that reversals 
of policy, changes of mind, are to be deplored and castigated as evidence of error, irresolution and 
general incompetence, and the apparent findings from our economic models that such reversals 
should optimally occur some four, or so, times more frequently than they do in practice. Maybe our 
models are missing something important. If not, we have then singularly failed to explain to the 
world at large how policy should be carried out. Either way, there is still an enormous amount of 
work to be done.”
3See Blinder (1998, pp. 11-12 and pp. 46-47).
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conservatism principle, which explains why policy makers may want to err on the side 
of caution.4 The second is the Rogoff conservative-central-banker approach, which 
explains why delegation to conservative central banks may improve social welfare.5
This chapter offers a critical view on the delegation literature and relaxes 
seemingly innocuous assumptions which this literature has continued to make about 
uncertainty and preferences. As to uncertainty, most of the literature assumes that the 
transmission mechanism is either deterministic or only subject to additive uncertainty. 
To generate a motive for caution, we wish to depart from certainty-equivalence. This 
is achieved in the simplest possible manner by introducing multiplicative instrument 
uncertainty. As to preferences, most of the literature follows Rogoff in assuming 
a particular form of conservatism, namely weight-conservatism, which is based on 
quadratic preferences. Weight-conservatism refers to a stronger preference for stable 
inflation than for stable output (around respective targets) but results in suboptimal 
output stabilisation. In contrast, we generalise the standard quadratic paradigm and 
derive new notions of conservatism that do not distort output stabilisation.
The implications of this chapter are threefold. First, the credibility problem 
of monetary policy may have been vastly exaggerated once it is recognised that policy 
makers have internal incentives to err on the side of caution. Second, previous models 
of delegation have focused on suboptimal notions of central-bank conservatism. We
4See Brainard (1967).
5 See Rogoff (1985).
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derive optimal concepts of conservatism (termed ‘target-conservatism’ and ‘stability- 
conservatism’) that mitigate, or eliminate, any residual problem of credibility. We also 
offer interpretations in terms of the practice of inflation targeting and the penchant 
of central banks for stability. Third, we rationalize why credible monetary policy may 
be conducive to stable inflation and output. In contrast to previous work, we find 
that conservatism need not necessarily lead to greater output variability and that 
the delegation to cautious and conservative central bankers may be consistent with a 
strong version of the free luch result of monetary policy delegation.
CH A PTER  TWO
The second chapter, titled ‘The Brainard Conservatism Principle with Non-Quadratic 
Objectives is based on joint work with Jagjit Chadha (University of Cambridge). The 
central issue addressed here is the robustness of the Brainard conservatism principle 
with respect to the specification of the policy maker’s loss function. In a dynamic 
context recall that this principle suggests that in the case of multiplicative instrument 
uncertainty the policy instrument is moved incompletely (or cautiously) and smoothly 
(or gradually).
We examine the implications for the optimal interest rate rule that follow 
from relaxing the assumption that the loss function is quadratic. In particular, we 
are interested in whether, and how, alternative loss functions give rise to caution 
and gradualism. We deviate from the quadratic framework in the following two
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respects. First, while keeping with the assumption of symmetry, we examine the 
optimal interest rule that is obtained when the policy maker’s preferences axe given 
by a split constant absolute risk aversion function. In contrast to the simple quadratic, 
the split-CARA allows us to flexibly change the curvature of the objective function. 
Second, we examine the consequences of asymmetric policy preferences for the optimal 
interest rule. This is achieved with a linear exponential objective function that allows 
us to parameterise the degree of asymmetry in a straightforward fashion.
We argue that non-quadratic preferences, per se, are neither sufficient nor 
necessary to generate the Brainard conservatism principle. First, if the uncertainty 
is additive, deviating from quadratics, while keeping with symmetry, does not buy us 
anything new: the optimal rule remains the same, and only the policy maker’s dead­
weight losses are different. Thus the question of curvature of the objective function, by 
itself, remains orthogonal to that of whether the policy maker should exhibit caution 
or gradualism in the conduct of policy.
Second, if the loss function represents a view that the policy maker’s implicit 
weights to downside and upside risk differ, the asymmetry tends to affect the optimal 
rule under both additive and multiplicative uncertainty but results in interest rate 
paths observationally similar, and in some cases equivalent, to those implied by a 
shifted quadratic.
We further explore the use of asymmetric loss functions in relation to how 
monetary policy is delegated to goal-dependent central bankers. We find that an
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inflation-targeting central bank that is required to be goal dependent should also 
be required to pursue the delegated goal in a symmetric way. We also argue 
that an asymmetry in the social costs of inflation can be translated into the level 
of the mandated target, without requiring that this target should be pursued 
asymmetrically.
C H A PTER  THREE
The third, and last, chapter, titled ‘Costly Collateral and the Public Supply of 
Liquidity \ starts from the observation that credit market imperfections, resulting 
from informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, may lead to an 
underprovision of external finance. Credit constraints clearly come at a cost: they 
prevent productive activity that is socially worthwhile. Society has dealt with such 
problem by requiring collateral or net worth as a condition to the provision of finance.
The central issue that is explored in this chapter concerns the pros and cons 
of collateral requirements as an element of optimal contracts between entrepreneur- 
borrowers and banks. The model relies on a problem of extreme moral hazard where 
entrepreneurs cannot commit the returns from their productive activity as these are 
assumed to be non-verifiable to courts. Collateralization is necessary (because of 
the information asymmetry) but generally incomplete (because of a liquidation cost). 
The assumption of costly collateral liquidation forms a first element in this model 
that contributes to the possibility of a collapse of financial intermediation.
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We examine how leverage and collateralization interact and find that 
collateralized finance may be highly susceptible to interest rate shocks if liquidation 
costs are high. We discuss two implications that emerge from this result. First, 
interest rate smoothing may be more desirable in countries that lack sufficient financial 
development. Second, costly collateral contributes to our understanding of the fink 
between the degree of financial development and the susceptibility of an economy to 
speculative currency attacks. We argue that the model provides micro-foundations 
for currency crisis models with self-fulfilling features.
The second element in our model that may cloud the beneficial role of 
collateral is aggregate asset price uncertainty.6 An issue of particular interest concerns 
the consequences of aggregate uncertainty for credit-constrained entrepreneurs, 
whose assets are maximally collateralized. It turns out that, from the point of 
view of the entrepreneur, an uncontingent contract (where collateralization varies 
countercyclically to offset fluctuation in liabilities) is dominated by a contingent 
contract (where liabilities vary with the asset price). However, from the point of view 
of banks that are poorly capitalized, aggregate uncertainty about collateral values
6This issue has also been raised in the IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook: “To the extent 
that falling stock and property prices affect the solvency of household and corporate borrowers, 
they tend to raise the share of non-performing loans in the portfolios of financial institutions, 
thereby undermining the banks’ capital position and lending capacity. Under generalized asset 
price deflation, these effects are reinforced by the falling value of collateral, which banks can usually 
recover in the case of outright defaults.” (IMF, 2000, p. 127).
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may introduce too much bank profit variability. If the bank’s solvency condition 
binds, entrepreneurs will be (further) deprived from credit, leading to a lower level 
of welfare. Under the conditions of poor bank and borrower capitalization, we find 
that state-contingent government provision of liquidity enhances the level of welfare 
in this economy.
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CHAPTER ONE
Caution and Conservatism
in the Making of Monetary Policy
“An important reason to expose central bankers to elected officials is that, 
just as the latter may have an inflationary bias, the former may easily 
develop a deflationary bias. Shielded as they are from public opinion, 
cocooned within an anti-inflationary temple, central bankers can all too 
easily deny ... that cyclical unemployment can be reduced by easing 
monetary policy.” (Stanley Fischer, 1994- P• 293)
Introduction
What principles should motivate the conduct and design of monetary policy? 
Uncertainty about what monetary policy can do and disagreement about what it 
should do have caused significant controversy on the practical resolution of this 
question. Uncertainty about the transmission mechanism and disagreement about 
the optimal form of delegation, in particular, have always complicated the making 
of policy and have led to a variety of policy regimes observed over time and across 
countries.
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Despite the ongoing debates, policy makers need to take a preliminary stance, 
though, on how to implement policy. And it seems, more often than not, that their 
practical response has been one of caution and conservatism. As reflected in the 
above quote, this immediately raises the concern whether caution and conservatism 
are desirable from a social welfare point of view. And, if they are, there is still the 
legitimate question whether actual policy makers conduct policy in an excessively 
cautious and conservative fashion. But in order to answer the latter question, 
a benchmark is needed, and therefore we first need to answer the former, more 
fundamental, question: do caution and conservatism improve the making of monetary 
policy? This is the central theme of the chapter.
Before proceeding let us first specify what we actually mean with caution 
and conservatism. Caution emerges from the interaction between uncertainty and 
preferences, and is meant to reflect a more neutral, or less activist, policy stance. 
Conservatism refers to preferences that are unrepresentative from a social point of 
view. Central-bank conservatism typically refers to a stronger emphasis on inflation 
than on output.
Our interest in the normative underpinnings of caution and conservatism 
is motivated by two observations. First, there is an unresolved tension between 
the popular perception that caution and conservatism are costly and the empirical 
finding that delegation to independent central bankers is beneficial. Given that central 
bankers are so often depicted as being cautious and conservative, the latter empirical
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finding (also known as the ‘free lunch result of delegation’) seems to suggest that 
these features are in fact desirable qualities. But is it really true that caution and 
conservatism are the blessings that generate this result? In order to arrive at such 
conclusions, one must first come up with a social welfare benchmark.
Second, policy makers have felt somewhat uneasy with the descriptive realism 
of the proposals suggested by the ‘credibility literature’. This is reflected, for example, 
in the call by McCallum to improve the “interpretive mappings between analytical 
constructs and real-world institutions” .7 The uneasiness about the lack of convergence 
between models and realities is probably best exemplified by Blinder (1998). However, 
in reviewing the literature, Blinder mentions two notable exceptions where minds have 
actually come together. The first is the so-called Brainard conservatism principle that 
rationalizes why policy makers may want to err on the side of caution.8 The second 
is the Rogoff conservative-central-banker approach that explains why policy makers 
with unrepresentative preferences may do things better.9 There is thus considerable 
independent interest in improving the models we use to describe policy makers. And, 
it is our intention to make a step into that direction with the analysis of both caution 
and conservatism.
7See McCallum (1995, p. 207), no emphasis added.
8See Brainard (1967).
9 See Rogoff (1985).
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This chapter jointly analyzes the optimal conduct and design of monetary 
policy, and examines the desirability of caution and conservatism. The framework we 
propose has the following two features: ‘multiplicative instrument uncertainty’ and 
‘generalized quadratic preferences’. First, in order to generate a motive for caution, 
we need to break certainty-equivalence. We do so in the simplest possible manner: we 
follow Brainard (1967) in assuming that monetary policy transmission is subject to 
multiplicative instrument uncertainty. Second, in order to discuss conservatism as an 
element of optimal monetary policy delegation, we need to deviate from the commonly 
assumed quadratic objective function. As we will show, the simple quadratic objective 
function does not allow us to generate optimal notions of conservatism. We propose 
a ‘generalized quadratic objective function’ that enables us to derive new notions of 
conservatism.
We will offer a critical perspective on the credibility literature of monetary 
policy. First of all, the problem of credibility may have been exaggerated if policy 
makers have internal incentives to conduct policy cautiously. We show that a stronger 
degree of caution, as a result of increased uncertainty, may actually lead to an 
improvement in social welfare.
Second, we introduce multiplicative uncertainty into the Rogoff (1985) model. 
We restrict the notion of conservatism to the suboptimal concepts used in the 
literature and show that, under these circumstances, an interesting relationship arises 
between the extent of uncertainty in the economy and the degree of conservatism of
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the central banker. Economies characterized by a large credibility problem will benefit 
from delegation to central bankers who become increasingly ‘ultra-conservative’ in the 
face of greater uncertainty.
Third, we argue that previous work has focused on suboptimal notions of 
conservatism. We derive optimal notions of conservatism that reproduce the best 
feasible equilibrium. In its extreme form, our approach will be interpreted as an 
application of Mundell’s (1968) ‘principle of effective market segmentation’. In its 
weaker form, we offer interpretations in terms of the practice of inflation targeting 
and the penchant of central banks for stability.
Finally, the model sheds some fight on the interaction between credibility and 
nominal and real stability. The model formalizes that “monetary policy can prevent 
money itself from being a major source of uncertainty” (Friedman, 1968, p. 12) and 
implies that the credibility of monetary policy, too, can help reduce the variability 
of inflation and output. The model therefore generates a (strong) version of the free 
lunch result of delegation.
At this stage, it is useful to discuss how our contribution relates to the 
literature. The uncertainties surrounding the making of monetary policy received 
considerable attention during the 1960’s and early 1970’s. Important contributions 
include those of Brainard (1967) on the effectiveness of policy under multiplicative 
uncertainty, Friedman (1968) on the merits of fixed rules when lags are long and 
variable, and Poole (1970) on the choice of an intermediate target under additive
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uncertainty. The question how policy makers operate under uncertainty has recently 
received renewed interest. Most of this literature, however, ignores the the credibility 
problem of monetary policy. Notable exceptions are Swank (1994), Letterie (1997) 
and Pearce and Sobue (1997). There is also a growing body of research on learning 
and optimal control theory in dynamic environments with multiplicative uncertainty10 
but none of these contributions addresses the role of preferences and monetary policy 
delegation.
With regard to optimal monetary policy delegation, the credibility literature 
has offered a convenient framework. This literature traditionally features a role 
for policy that is clouded by various policy conflicts, such as the temptation to 
use monetary policy for the wrong reasons and the trade-off between inflation 
and output variability. The analysis of monetary policy delegation gained much 
impetus with the application of the notion of time-inconsistency (Kydland and 
Prescott, 1977) to monetary economics (Barro and Gordon, 1983a), which led to 
the discovery of a credibility problem in the form of an inflationary bias. Much 
of the subsequent literature has then looked for possible mechanisms that reduce 
or remove such a credibility problem without compromising the flexibility needed
10See, for example, Bertocchi and Spagat (1993), Wieland (1996), Estrella and Mishkin (1998), 
Sack (1998), Svensson (1999). Interestingly, this literature has also illustrated the possibility of 
uncertainty leading to more aggressive policy. See Craine (1979), Sargent (1998) and Onatski and 
Stock (1998).
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for output stabilisation. Barro and Gordon (1983b) and Canzoneri (1985) suggest 
reputational forces that may restore the economy’s best feasible equilibrium. One 
prominent approach suggests the delegation of monetary policy to an independent 
central banker with incentives distinct from those of the government. Walsh (1995a) 
and Persson and Tabellini (1993) have argued that the apparent trade-off between 
credibility and flexible output stabilisation arises because the delegation mechanism 
is restricted to ad-hoc incentive structures. If instead an inflation contract ensuring 
an optimal incentive structure were introduced, the best feasible equilibrium would 
prevail with full credibility and flexibility simultaneously.11 Our approach does bear 
some similarity to Walsh (1995a), who highlighted how restrictive assumptions on the 
delegation mechanism may generate a credibihty-flexibility trade-off. This branch of 
the credibility literature, however, does not have anything to say about central-bank 
conservatism. Moreover, as is the case for most of the credibility literature, the issue 
of caution is ignored: most studies assume that the transmission mechanism is either 
deterministic or subject only to additive uncertainty.
Instead, we draw on another branch of the credibility literature. Rogoff (1985) 
proposes the delegation of monetary policy to central banks with divergent preferences
11 Side payments in the form of a linear penalty on inflation would do the trick but implementation 
may present practical difficulties. Critical discussions can be found in Blinder (1998), Canzoneri, 
Nolan and Yates (1997), Goodhart and Vinals (1994), King (1997) and Walsh (1995b). The 
incentives implied by the optimal contract could also be implemented with a dismissal rule (Walsh, 
1995c). For further extensions, see Fratianni et al. (1997).
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and shows that the appointment of a ‘weight-conservative’ central banker improves 
the problem of imperfect credibility.12 However, given that the notion of weight- 
conservatism refers to the relative preference for inflation versus output stabilisation, 
complete removal of the inflationary bias would entail too high a cost in terms of 
output variability. As a result, a suboptimal equilibrium is obtained and this has been 
the reason why attention has for some time shifted away from delegation mechanisms 
based on conservatism.
Recently, a few studies have re-established a role for weight-conservatism by 
enriching the environment in which the central bank conducts policy. Herrendorf 
and Lockwood (1997) and Svensson (1997a) suggest that weight-conservatism may 
be useful when the inflationary bias is state-contingent and the delegation decision 
is not. Rather than enriching the environment so that a role for weight-conservatism 
re-emerges, our approach suggests a review of the notion of weight-conservatism itself.
An interesting contribution that also reconsiders the concept of conservatism 
is Svensson (1997b). He shows that conservatism in the form of a lower inflation target 
may lead to the best feasible equilibrium, where inflation settles down at its socially 
optimal level. However, as suggested by King (1997), this proposal raises doubts as 
it is implied that central banks should target inflation rates that are anticipated to 
be missed systematically.
12See also Flood and Isard (1989), Lohmann (1992), Waller (1992), Waller and Walsh (1996) and 
Obstfeld (1997).
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The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 1 develops a baseline 
model of caution in the conduct of policy. Section 2 addresses the role of conservatism 
in the delegation of monetary policy under quadratic preferences. Section 3 introduces 
generalized preferences and derives optimal notions of conservatism. Section 4 applies 
the framework to the free lunch result of delegation. The last section concludes.
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1. Caution in the Making of M onetary Policy
This section examines the role of caution in the conduct of policy. In later sections, 
we will consider the role of central-bank conservatism.
1.1. Description of the Model
We begin with a description of the economic environment. Aggregate supply is 
represented by a standard surprise supply function:
y = y* + b(n — 7re) + e b > 0, (1)
where y is log of output, y* is log of natural output, 7r is inflation, 7re is expected 
inflation, and e is a temporary aggregate supply shock with mean 0 and variance o\.
Aggregate demand is assumed to be primarily influenced by a policy maker, 
who can generate inflationary surprises. Denote the planned deviation of the 
policy maker’s single instrument from its neutral level by ip. Due to multiplicative 
instrument uncertainty, the policy maker controls inflation imperfectly:
7T =  s ip , (2)
where s is a multiplicative instrument shock with mean 1 and variance a2. All 
variances in the model are strictly positive and finite. For analytical convenience, 
supply and control shocks are independent of each other. The assumption of 
multiplicative instrument uncertainty marks a first departure from the literature
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which generally assumes that transmission is either deterministic or subject only 
to additive uncertainty.
In practice, randomness in the relation between policy instrument and policy 
goal is of course the result of various, possibly conflicting, forces. Also, control 
typically becomes more difficult depending on whether the policy maker wants to 
affect instruments, operating targets, intermediate targets or ultimate policy goal 
variables. Shocks to the interest elasticities of money demand and aggregate demand 
are examples of factors that constrain the policy maker’s ability to control inflation 
in an accurate manner.
The multiplicative nature of the shock is meant to reflect that policy makers 
become more agnostic about the consequences of their actions, the larger the policy 
deviation they wish to introduce. In particular, the specification implies that inflation 
is more variable and less predictable when it is higher, a feature that has strong 
empirical foundations (see, for example, Okun, 1971; Taylor, 1981; Ball and Cecchetti, 
1990). A number of authors, including Okun and Ball and Cecchetti, have argued 
that this relationship is motivated through the effect of inflation on policy. When 
inflation is low, a concensus typically arises that it should be kept low. As a result, 
inflation is stable and predictable. However, in the case of moderate or high inflation, 
disagreement may arise about the necessity of reducing it, and so inflation becomes 
more variable and difficult to predict. Judd and Scadding (1982) offer an alternative 
explanation based on financial innovation. They argue that the most likely cause of
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the observed instability in the demand for money (after 1973) has been innovation 
in financial arrangements. These innovations allowed agents to economize on their 
holdings of transactions balances and appeared to have been triggered, to a large 
extent, by high inflation rates. Thus, high inflation, through its effect on financial 
innovation, may lead to more difficult monetary control. Holland (1993) argues that 
the strong (postwar) link between the rate of inflation and the degree of inflation 
uncertainty, may have been due to the uncertainty of forecasters about the impact 
of money growth on the price level. He presents evidence indicating that this has 
been the case. As long as the impact of money growth on the price level remains 
unpredictable, then even predictable money growth will cause inflation uncertainty.
The description of the monetary policy game is standard. There are two 
players: a private sector and a policy maker. Before locking itself into a nominal 
wage contract, the private sector formulates a prediction (7re) about the increase in 
the price level during the duration of the contract. The strategy of the policy maker is 
to choose the degree of policy intervention (ip). The timing is as follows. At time one, 
the private sector optimally chooses 7re. At time two, a supply shock e is realized. 
At time three, the policy maker optimally chooses instrument ip. At time four, a 
control shock s is realized and inflation, output and the payoffs of the players are 
determined. The information set of the private sector at time one only includes the 
structure of the model, whereas that of the policy maker at time three also includes
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the realization of the supply shock. At the times of their respective decisions, both 
players are uninformed about the future realization of the control shock.
The private sector’s objective is to minimize forecast errors. Optimal 
prediction requires ne = E[ir], where E[n\ denotes the mathematical expectation 
over the inflation rate, conditional on the private sector’s information set at time one.
The description of the policy maker’s objective function marks a second 
departure from previous work, which generally assumes regular quadratic preferences.* 
We propose the following extension of the quadratic objective function:
Q =  (E  [7r])2 +  OiVar[n]
+  fh (E  [v] ~  kV*f +  02 Var[y] , (3)
where /zl5 /i2, 6 \ and 02 > 0  and k > 1. We will term (3) the ‘generalized quadratic 
objective function’. The policy maker is assumed to be concerned about inflation 
and output. The objective function reflects, for each variable of interest, the cost 
of a mean-squared bias (MSB) around a target and the cost of variability around 
the mean. The inflation target has been set to zero. The output target equals ky*
and exceeds the natural rate (as k >  1). The policy maker’s concern for systematic
underproduction may arise from the presence of labor market distortions or from 
political economy considerations. In what follows, the gap between the natural rate 
and the target rate of output will be denoted by z = (k — 1 )y* > 0.
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The novelty of this objective function lies in the separation of the costs of 
expected and unexpected deviations in inflation and output. Parameters /ij and 
p2 measure the intensity of the policy maker’s aversion to systematically missing 
the inflation and output target. Parameters 9\ and 6 2  measure the policy maker’s 
preference for nominal and real stability. Note that the simple quadratic objective 
function obtains as a special case of (3). The quadratic objective function imposes 
the technical restriction that iiY =  Q\ and p 2 — For example, let /Zj =  9\ =  a and 
^ 2 = 9 2 = 1. We then obtain:
Q =  E  [qtt2 +  (y -  ky*)2] , (4)
where a  measures the relative aversion to inflation variability versus output variability 
around their respective targets.
We can think of a normative and a political economy justification for the 
proposed objective function. From a normative perspective, it may well be the case 
that society values expected versus unexpected deviations asymmetrically (resulting 
in ^  ^  9i for some i € {1,2}). For example, if shoe-leather costs of inflation are 
primarily associated with expected inflation and the costs of relative price distortion 
with unexpected inflation, society may find expected inflation relatively more costly 
(fj,x > 91) if shoe-leather costs are relatively larger. All we need is that expected and 
unexpected deviations produce different types or magnitudes of costs.
Chapter One 36
Prom a political economy perspective, even if the preferences of society, or 
the government for that matter, cannot be represented by the generalized objective 
function, there may still be an interest in delegating monetary policy to a different 
agent whose behavior accords to a generalized preference structure. Society could 
instruct the agent to conduct policy as if the agent’s preferences were given by (3).
The generalized objective function serves a double purpose in this chapter. 
First, with regard to the analysis of caution, it will make sense to focus not only 
on ‘risk’ (measured by but also on the ‘price of risk’ (measured by 9\ and 6 2 ). 
Second, with regard to the role of conservatism, policy maker heterogeneity in terms 
of Pi, and 02 will prove helpful in the design of optimal delegation mechanisms.
1.2. Equilibrium
Given the set-up outlined above, we now look for a time-consistent equilibrium. 
Consider, as a description of the policy maker’s strategy, the following linear policy 
reaction function:
ip — Ai +  A2e.
Because of the linear-quadratic framework, we can focus without loss of generality 
on policy reaction functions of this form.Given the reaction function, the inflation 
outcome will be:
7r =  s (Ai +  A2e ) . (5)
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Taking rational expectations over (5), the private sector’s optimal strategy is to set
7Te =  A i .
The policy maker’s optimal choice of Ai and A2 minimizes (3) subject to the 
strategy of the private sector, the specification of uncertainty, and Equations (1) and 
(2 ). Substituting the relevant equations into the objective function and evaluating 
expectations at time one yields:
f t ( A l f A 2) =  ^  { A ? }
+  /i2 { (6A1 -  &7Te -  Z )  2 }
+ 0i { A2 +  (A2 +  cr\A2) }
+  02 { 0 % (1 +  b\ 2) 2 +  b2 cr2 (A2 +  cr2 A2) } , (6 )
where the first two lines display the respective mean-squared biases for inflation and 
output and the last two lines their respective variances.
It is instructive to see how the four terms in (6 ) axe affected by Ai and 
A2. The credibility part of the policy rule (Ai) shows up in all four terms. The 
stabilisation part of the policy rule (A2) matters only for the variance terms. As in the 
standard literature, optimal stabilisation policy trades off the benefit of lower output 
variability against the cost of higher inflation variability. But now, with multiplicative 
uncertainty, the policy maker also needs to take into account the consequences of
policy non-neutrality (Ai ^  0  or A2 0 ) for the variability in inflation and output.
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The first-order conditions for Ai and A2 are:
M i  +  O2. (*1 +  b2 ea) Aj =  &/i2 (z + bn' -  6A,) x f  1 -  ; (7)
( l  +  a j) (0i +  6202) c 2A2 =  — 602cr2 , (8)
where 7re is to be evaluated at Ai.
Equation (7) illustrates the problem of time-inconsistency. If a formal 
commitment technology exists, the policy maker could commit to fully take into 
account the endogeneity of expected inflation with respect to the policy regime 
(i.e. d7re/dXi = 1). The solution under commitment (c) would then be given by 
ip =  AJ +  with
A? =  0 ;
602\ cA 2 (1 +  ai) (0 ! +  6202) '
However, if no formal commitment technology exists, the endogeneity of 
expected inflation is not internalized (<dne/d \ i  =  0). Optimal policy is then time- 
inconsistent and time-consistent policy is suboptimal (Kydland and Prescott, 1977) 
with:
bn2z  .
Al iH + o lQ i+ M i)  ’
X* =  "  (1 +  * 2) (e l  +  m 2) ’ (10)
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where the A’s without superscripts refer to the no-commitment solution. Note that 
Ai > XI and A2 =  A^ . The equilibrium policy reaction function is then given by:
< p =  bJ h i_______________ bJ i______ e (n )
to  +  <7? (01 +  fc202) (1 +  ^ ) ( « 1  +  W a ) ' ( ’
Finally, the equilibrium realizations of inflation and output equal:
7r =  s (Ai +  A2e ),
y =  y* + (s — 1) 6Ai +  (1 +  s6A2) e ,
where Ai and A2 are given by (9) and (10).
1.3. Properties of Equilibrium
In equilibrium, expected inflation equals:
E  M =  Ah +  o*. £  +  b2 6 2) ' (12)
Average inflation exceeds the zero target rate of inflation. The inflationary bias
arises because of the policy maker’s systematic desire to surprise the private sector 
so as to achieve real output objectives (z > 0). In equilibrium, E[y\ =  y* because 
the inflationary bias exactly offsets the policy maker’s temptation to surprise. Not 
surprisingly, a weaker preference for the inflation target relative to the output target 
(a lower /^i/aa2) leads to more inflation in equilibrium. One further mechanism arises 
due to the presence of multiplicative uncertainty.
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PROPOSITION 1. Caution enhances the credibility of monetary policy.
The temptation to inflate is moderated by two other factors: the amplification of 
inflation and output variability through policy non-neutrality (as <j\ > 0) and the 
aversion to such variability (measured by 9i > 0 and 6 2 > 0). The interaction between 
uncertainty and preferences results in cautious policy making. Recall that caution 
here refers to a more neutral, or less activist, policy stance.13 The private sector 
rationally understands the policy maker’s motive for caution and this will reduce the 
inflationary bias.14
The equilibrium variance of inflation is given by:
K or[ir]=  ( 0i +  6202)  +  ( p ,  +  («! +  W „ ))  (13)
To interpret this expression, imagine an economy without multiplicative shocks 
(crl =  0). The second term then disappears and the variability of inflation would
13 Note that we have assumed that the consequences of multiplicative uncertainty are minimized 
when the policy deviation is set to zero. A cautious policy maker will want to set the instrument 
closer to this neutral threshold.
14The statement that uncertainty may improve credibility is not new. Devereux (1987) proposes 
an indirect mechanism: uncertainty induces wage setters to index nominal contracts, which reduces 
the effectiveness of surprise inflation and also the temptation of the policy maker to surprise. Swank 
(1994) and Pearce and Sobue (1997) show that uncertainty induces caution into policy making, 
directly constraining the temptation to surprise. This model focuses explicitly on the interaction 
between uncertainty and preferences to explain caution and will address delegation mechanisms 
which enhance the degree of caution.
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crucially depend on 6 1 / 6 2 . For a given degree of supply volatility, the policy maker will 
be increasingly reluctant to vary the inflation rate if nominal stability is preferred to 
real stability ( 6 1  > 6 2 ). Multiplicative uncertainty (cr^  > 0) affects inflation variability 
in two ways. First, the policy maker becomes cautious and therefore less willing to 
stabilise output (the first term). Second, caution leads to more neutral policy and 
therefore smaller control errors (the second term). The overall effect is ambiguous, 
as the second channel may offset the first for relatively small degrees of uncertainty
(CT» < / i l / ( 6,l + fc202))-
The equilibrium variance of output is given by:
Var[yI= (Gi+w) +<7‘) T+^ f + 62 Cl+ <^+6%)) (14)
Without multiplicative shocks, the variability of output primarily depends on 0i/#2- 
Multiplicative uncertainty affects output variability in two ways. First, output 
variability rises as the policy maker becomes cautious (the first term). Second, 
increased policy neutrality reduces the size of control errors that feed into output 
fluctuations (the second term). The overall effect is again ambiguous.
What are the overall implications for the policy maker’s welfare?
PROPOSITION 2: In the absence of an underproduction problem, multiplicative 
uncertainty unambiguously reduces welfare. In the absence of a stabilisation problem, 
multiplicative uncertainty unambiguously raises welfare. I f  both underproduction and 
stabilisation are an issue, the effect on welfare is ambiguous.
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To see this, substitute the mean-square biases and the variances of inflation and 
output into the objective function and differentiate with respect to <j 2s\
First, underproduction may not be a problem either because there is no
uncertainty would then reduce welfare. Intuitively, this results from the fact that 
higher uncertainty makes stabilisation more cautious, thereby distorting the policy 
maker’s previously preferred balance between inflation and output variability. Output 
stabilisation may not be problematic either because there are no productivity shocks 
to stabilise (<r€ =  0) or because output stability is not valued by the policy 
maker ( 6 2  =  0). From (15), it follows that multiplicative uncertainty would then 
increase welfare. The intuition here is that uncertainty reduces the inflationary bias 
without creating additional distortions. In the intermediate case, the welfare effect is 
ambiguous and depends on the condition in (15).
The result that uncertainty may improve welfare is an application of the old 
idea that the introduction of an additional distortion in a second-best world does 
not necessarily reduce welfare. Of course, this need not imply that such uncertainty 
should be increased deliberately. There are more efficient ways to improve on the 
welfare properties of equilibrium and it is to these that we now turn our attention.
(15)
underproduction (z =  0) or because underproduction is not valued in the policy
maker’s objective function (p2 = 0)- From (15), it is clear that multiplicative
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2. M onetary Policy Delegation w ith Quadratic Preferences
We now consider the delegation of monetary policy to an independent agent (‘the 
central bank’) with preferences distinct from those of the principal (‘the government’). 
We ask whether central bankers who conduct policy cautiously, as a result of 
uncertainty, should be required to also conduct policy conservatively. To put it 
differently, does uncertainty obviate the need for conservatism? And, if it does not, 
are uncertainty and conservatism substitutable or complementary?
In addressing these questions, we assume regular quadratic preferences for 
the moment. The objective functions of the government and the central bank are 
respectively given by:
Cl =  E  [ Q7T2 +  (y -  ky* ) 2 ] ;
Cl* =  E  [ a V  +  (y -  ky * ) 2 ] ,
where only a  and a* are allowed to differ. If a* > a, the central banker attaches 
a stronger weight to the stabilisation of inflation than to that of output around the 
respective targets. The central banker is then said to be weight-conservative.
In considering mechanisms indexed by a* only, we restrict attention to 
constrained-optimal delegation mechanisms. The setting therefore closely corresponds 
to the Rogoff (1985) model. Later on, we will use generalized preferences and look 
for optimal delegation mechanisms based on conservatism.
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2.1. The Rogoff Conservative Central Banker Revisited
It is well-known that delegation to a weight-conservative central banker (a* > a) 
improves the welfare properties of the discretionary equilibrium. But does the 
same conclusion continue to hold in an environment with multiplicative uncertainty? 
Appointment of a weight-conservative central banker results in an equilibrium with:
„  r ! bzE  7T = a* +  a 2 (a* +  b2) ’
V a r W  = ( ^ )  + ( o. + o ^  + y))
Var[y] =  ( { « ? & )  +<7») I ^ f  +  b2{ a* +  al(a* + b*))  
and E[y] =  y*. These expressions are obtained as special cases of (12)-(14) with 
= Qi =  a* and /x2 =  #2 =  1» Substituting them into the loss function of the 
government, Cl = a (E [ir])2 +  aVar [7r] +  (E[y] — ky* ) 2 +  Var[y], and differentiating 
with respect to a* yields the following result:
PROPOSITION 3: In an economy with multiplicative instrument uncertainty,
delegation to an independent central banker is welfare improving as long as the central 
banker is weight-conservative but not excessively weight-conservative.
Some algebra results in the following expression for government welfare:
a b2 +  a ’2 +  <72 (a* +  b2)2\  a\ a  +  <r2(a +  b2) _2 2
(a* + i 2)2 )  l  +  <r2 (a* +  <r2(a* +  fe2))2
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The optimal degree of weight-conservatism follows from inspection of:
a n  =  _  ( a  +  ^  +  ^ H i + ^ W  +  — ( g - q )  (
5a* (a* a \(a* + b2)) (1 +  cr2) (a* +  b2)
First, note that, for 0 < a* < a, the first term in (16) is strictly negative while the 
second one is only weakly negative. As a result, dCl/da* < 0. Second, the sign of 
dQ/da* must become positive for large values of a*. To see this, note that the first 
term in (16) is negative while the second term is positive (for a* > a). Both terms 
converge to 0 as a* approaches H-oo. The first term converges at rate a*-3, while 
the second term converges only at rate a*-2. Consequently, d?l/da* must become 
positive as a* —► -f oo.
It is useful to establish this result also graphically. To interpret Figure 1, first 
rewrite condition (16) as
a* = a + (« + <^ + fr2))(l + < a y  + 62)3 x s  F(q.). (17)
(o* +  (r2(“ * +  fc2)) W
where the left-hand side is the 45-degree line and the right-hand side is a complicated 
function denoted by F(a*). The Appendix establishes the following properties 
for F (a*): (i) both F (0) and F  (+oo) are finite quantities exceeding a; (ii)
dF (a*) /da* < 0; (iii) d2F (a*)/da*2 > 0. These properties ensure that shape 
of F(a*) conforms with the way it is drawn in Figure 1. As F  (a*) monotonically 
decreases in a* and is bounded above and below by quantities larger than a, optimal 
weight-conservatism (a*opt) is uniquely determined. (Other solutions to the fourth- 
order polynomial are two complex conjugates and a real root that is negative,
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Figure 1. The Optimal Degree of Conservatism
Chapter One 47
given the location of the of the vertical asymptote at — b2 a \/  (1 +  <j\).) Note that 
a*opt is bounded above and below. The finite upper bound is given by F  (0). The 
lower bound is given by F  (+oo), which is strictly larger than a.
Rogoff’s (1985) analysis on the desirability of weight-conservatism thus seems 
robust to more general forms of uncertainty. Intuitively, weight-conservatism reduces 
the inflationary bias problem in a first-order way while only affecting the variance of 
output (and inflation) in a second-order way, thereby improving overall welfare. It 
is still impossible to restore full credibility, as a complete removal of the inflationary 
bias problem would continue to require more weight-conservatism than is optimal 
from the point of view of output stabilisation.
2.2. Conservatism, Ultra-Conservatism and Uncertainty
What axe the consequences of an exogenous increase in the degree of multiplicative 
instrument uncertainty for the optimal degree of weight-conservatism?
PROPOSITION 4: When optimal delegation suggests a moderate amount of
conservatism, higher uncertainty reduces the optimal degree of conservatism. When 
optimal delegation requires ultra-conservatism, higher uncertainty increases the 
optimal degree of conservatism. Ultra-conservatism is defined by a* > u , where 
uj = 3a +  2b2cr2s/  (1 +  cr2) .
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Figure 2. The Ambiguous Trade-Off between Uncertainty and Conservatism
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The Appendix provides a proof.
This result can also be illustrated graphically. Consider the consequences 
of an increase in a2. Figure 2 is divided into two Regions. In Region 1, moderate 
conservatism (a* < u) was optimal before the change in a2. In Region 2, ultra­
conservatism (a* > u) was optimal initially. The curves Fi(a*) and F2 (a*) are
examples of environments consistent with Region 1 and Region 2. What happens 
when a 2 increases? The left-hand side of (17) is not affected by a2. Moreover, the 
Appendix establishes that dF  (a*) /d a 2 < 0 for a* < u  and vice versa. As a result, 
Fi(a*) will shift down to F[(a*) and 7*2(a*) will shift up to F^a*). Optimal weight- 
conservatism therefore decreases from a* to a\' in Region 1 and increases from qJ to 
a*  in Region 2.
While weight-conservatism remains welfare-improving under multiplicative 
uncertainty, its optimal level becomes dependent on the degree of such uncertainty. 
Intuitively, this follows from the observationally similar consequences of uncertainty 
and conservatism for the policy maker’s equilibrium reaction function:
•p =  bz________________ b______
a* +  cr2 (a* +  b2) (1 -f a2) (a* +  b2) 6
Note that both a* and cr2 reduce the systematic and feedback part in the policy rule. 
In environments where output stabilisation is a major issue and where therefore ultra­
conservatism can never be optimal (see Proposition 3), uncertainty and conservatism
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axe partial substitutes. If output stabilisation is only a minor issue, ultra-conservatism 
may be optimal initially and uncertainty and conservatism are partial complements.
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3. M onetary Policy Delegation with Generalized Preferences
Weight-conservatism generally improves, but does not remove, the credibility problem 
of monetary policy. But why should the meaning of conservatism be artificially 
restricted to the particular notion of weight-conservatism? Why does the government 
not design a scheme that requires the central banker to behave conservatively in 
some optimal fashion? In answering these questions, we will now consider generalized 
preferences for the government and the central bank:
n  =  Hi(E[7r])2 +  fi2 (E [y] -  k y ' f  +  6iVar[n\ +  02Var [y\ ;
Q- =  l 4 (E[n ] f  +  & { E [ y \ - k y * ) 2 + e\Var\ir} + 9lVar[y] ,
where stars refer to the central bank’s objective function. Note, however, that all the 
results would carry through if the government had regular quadratic preferences.
3.1. The Principle of Effective Market Classification
To begin with, consider delegation mechanisms where only and fi\ are allowed
to vary. The preference space of the central banker is therefore restricted to
(MliA*2. 0 1 .  0 2 ) -
PROPOSITION 5: Delegation of monetary policy to a central banker who disregards 
underproduction = ®) leads to the second-best.
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The proof is straightforward. Optimization subject to n\ =  0 leads to the following 
policy reaction function:
=  " ( l  +  ^ W  +  W a ) * ’ (18)
which corresponds to commitment. The equilibrium in this economy is characterized
by full credibility (E  [7r] =  0) and efficient stabilisation:
Var[7r] =  T T ^ ’ (19)
Var[y]  =  ( ( ^ r k )  +<T' )  ■ (20)
This mechanism resembles what several authors have suggested informally. 
To quote Alan Blinder, for example, “a disarmingly simple solution to the Kydland- 
Prescott problem [is to] direct the central bank to behave as if it prefers [t/*] 
rather than [ky*]” . 15 This does not require, of course, that there would be no 
underproduction. All that is required, is that the central bank does not value the 
cost of underproduction, which can be nicely formalized with the generalized objective 
function by setting =  0. The proposal can also be interpreted as an application 
of Mundell’s ‘principle of effective market classification’. This principle suggests that 
“an instrument should be matched with the target on which it exerts the greatest
15Blinder (1998, p. 43), no emphasis added. See also McCallum (1995, p. 208-9): “All that is 
needed for avoidance of the inflationary bias ... is for the CB to recognize the futility of continually 
exploiting expectations ..., and to recognize that its objectives would be more fully achieved on 
average if it were to abstain from attempts to exploit these temporarily-given expectations.”
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relative influence”.16 In this context, it is clear that monetary policy is not the 
right tool to deal with underproduction. If underproduction arises from labor market 
distortions, for example, structural labor market policy would be the right way to 
proceed.
A conceptually related mechanism can be derived if we restrict attention to 
delegation mechanisms where only 6 \ and can be varied. The central banker’s 
preference space is then restricted to /x2, 0J, 0J)- Recall that 0 \ and 0*2 measure 
the preference intensity of the central bank for nominal and real stability. If we wish 
to retain an optimal mix of output and inflation stabilisation, it must be the case that 
0\/9 2 = 0 i/02. This implies that 6 J =  x*0i and 02 =  x*02> where x* >  0 measures 
the central bank’s overall concern for stability.
PROPOSITION 6: Delegation of monetary policy to a central banker with an exclusive 
concern for stability (x* ~* °°) leads to the second-best
If x* —► oo, the central bank’s optimization problem ignores the MSB in inflation and 
output. Consequently, there will be no problem of credibility and, by construction, 
stabilisation will be optimal. This will correspond to commitment. The policy 
reaction function is given by (18), the variances of inflation and output by (19) and 
(20). Expected inflation equals zero and expected output is at the natural rate.
16See Mundell (1968, p. 203).
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Again, this is an application of Mundell’s principle. If monetary policy, unlike 
structural policy, is a relatively swift tool for short-frequency stabilisation, optimal 
policy assignment implies that monetary policy should focus on what it is good at.17
3.2. Target-Conservatism and Stability-Conservatism
A valid criticism to any discretionary delegation scheme is that it may be overturned 
after the private sector has locked itself into nominal contracts. It is indeed odd that 
a government can perfectly commit to an institutional regime it puts into existence 
but not to the optimal monetary policy rule in the first place. This point, put 
forward by McCallum (1995), has been formalized by Jensen (1998), who shows that
17Propositions 6 and 7 seem identical but they are not. A central banker who disregards 
underproduction ( / =  0) still cares about the mean level of inflation. A central banker with 
an exclusive concern for stability (x* —> oo) does not. Both approaches are equivalent in that the 
second-best equilibrium is obtained. But the reasons why zero average inflation is chosen differ. In 
the first case, the central banker suffers a direct loss from nonzero average inflation. In the second 
case, the central banker suffers an indirect loss: if >  0, even the slightest systematic policy non­
neutrality (i.e. Ai > 0) is amplified to an infinite extent. The central banker will therefore choose 
zero average inflation out of a concern for nominal and real stability. Note that the x*-approach 
only works in conjunction with multiplicative uncertainty. If — 0, the equilibrium inflationary 
bias would be indeterminate.
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the traditional second-best mechanisms break down when the cost of changing the 
monetary regime is not prohibitive.18
Prom a practical perspective, the identification of an institutional commitment 
problem should not be interpreted as a denial of the usefulness of delegation 
mechanisms in reducing the problem of credibility. To see this, consider that the 
monetary policy has been assigned to what it is good at and that the optimality 
requirements pi ~  0 or x* —* 00 have been formalized in the constitution of the 
central bank. The credibility of the constitutional regime will then depend on the 
cost of changing the constitution. In case of a prohibitive cost, p\ = 0 or x* -♦ is 
renegotiation-proof. In the absence of a cost, p\ =  0 or x* ~ 5> 00 1S not renegotiation- 
proof. Time-consistency would in that case require pi — p 2 °r X* = X =  1 and we are 
back at the discretionary solution. In what follows, we will discuss the intermediate 
case where the cost is nonzero but finite.
T arget-C onservatism . Consider for example the case where the central 
banker has a stronger relative disregard for the output target versus the inflation 
target than the government has. This would correspond to p \fp i > P\/P 2 and is
18McCallum (1995) argues that delegation merely relocates the time-inconsistency problem from 
one commitment problem (to a rule) into another one (to a regime). Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1996) 
show that the Walsh contract does not solve the time-inconsistency problem but relocates the 
credibility problem as a renegotiation problem. Jensen (1998) shows that a reputational solution to 
the credibility problem may still exist, although its likelihood becomes smaller when reappointment 
costs are positive.
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termed the degree of ‘target-conservatism’. Note that such a regime will produce 
a lower inflationary bias without distorting output stabilisation (as 0 \ / 0 2 = #i/# 2  
continues to hold). A natural empirical counterpart of an institutional set-up which 
induces an increase in the degree of target-conservatism is a regime of inflation 
targeting, where attention is diverted from the inconsistent output objective towards 
the inflation target. The concept of target-conservatism is in concert with the claim by 
practitioners that inflation targeting need not imply that output is ignored (Bernanke 
and Mishkin, 1997; King, 1997). As we have shown, target-conservatism does not 
distort output stabilisation.
Stability-C onservatism . Consider next the possibility where the central. 
banker has a stronger overall preference for stability than the government has. 
This would correspond to x* > X = 1 and is termed the degree of ‘stability- 
conservatism’. Once again, this leads to a lower inflationary bias without creating 
additional stabilisation distortions (as x* does not affect 0l/0 2 = 0 1 / 6 2 ). The notion 
of stability-conservatism seems to accord with successful monetary policy often being 
attributed to the penchant of central banks for stability. The model in this chapter 
shows that this feature may indeed be a desirable one. A penchant for stability 
leads to a lower inflationary bias provided that the economic environment features 
multiplicative uncertainty. Because of the central bank’s stronger preference for 
nominal and real stability, uncertainty is now x* times more costly and this will
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lead to greater caution in the conduct of policy. This in turn reduces the inflationary 
bias (cf. Proposition 1).
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4. Application: The Free Lunch Result o f D elegation
Empirical studies have suggested that the delegation of monetary policy to an 
independent central bank is like a free lunch: it lowers inflation without increasing 
the variability of output.19 At the theoretical level, this has created an anomaly 
in the Rogoff (1985) model, which predicts higher output variability in response to 
weight-conservatism. Subsequent research has shown that the free lunch result may be 
explained by (i) the offsetting interaction between higher ‘economic variability’ due to 
increased weight-conservatism and lower ‘political variability’ due to better insulation 
from the political business cycle (Alesina and Gatti, 1995); (ii) a positive correlation 
between the degree of central bank independence and the ability to stabilise or the 
degree of fiscal discipline (Fischer, 1995); (iii) the presence of a second-best delegation 
scheme (Svensson, 1997b). We offer an alternative explanation.
PROPOSITION 7. In the presence of multiplicative instrument uncertainty, target- 
conservatism and stability-conservatism enhance nominal and real stability.
19See Alesina and Summers (1993), Debelle and Fischer (1994) and Fischer (1995). One caveat 
applies to the result that central bank independence causes low inflation at no real cost. Posen 
(1993, 1995) argues that correlations between institutions and economic outcomes may be spurious. 
In the context of this paper, for example, a period of economic instability may trigger a stronger 
aversion to variability (a higher x*)> thereby making the development of institutions supporting that 
aversion more likely.
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Consider first the consequences of target- and stability-conservatism for output
variability. The variances of output will be respectively given by:
Var[y]
Var[y]
0, +  b2 8 2
0,  +  620 2
Note that, in both cases, the first term is unaffected while the second term will be 
lower. The first term is unaffected precisely because target- and stability-conservatism
and stability-conservatism are conducive to a more neutral average policy stance. A
environment with no delegation mechanism in place that reduces, or removes, the 
inflationary bias. The consequences for inflation variability are entirely analogous.
With reference to the earlier quote from Friedman (1968) on page 26, this 
result implies that the credibility of monetary policy, too, can help preventing money 
from being a source of variability. The implications for the free lunch result of 
delegation are thus twofold. First of all, delegation to a conservative central banker 
does not entail suboptimal output stabilisation if conservatism is not arbitrarily 
restricted to the notion of weight-conservatism. Alternative forms of conservatism, 
such as target-conservatism and stability-conservatism, reduce the inflationary bias 
without distorting the stabilisation of output. Second, any delegation scheme which
are optimal forms of conservatism. The second term decreases because both target-
stronger tendency towards policy neutrality reduces the nuisance of multiplicative
random shocks. As a result, the variability of output will be lower relative to an
Chapter One 60
improves or removes the credibility problem of monetary policy reduces at the same 
time the variability of output (and of inflation), if the transmission of monetary policy 
is subject to multiplicative uncertainty.
The overall theoretical implication is thus, surprisingly, that delegation based 
on optimal notions of conservatism should not only lead to lower inflation but also to 
less variable output. Strictly speaking, the empirical finding that delegation does not 
affect output variability could then be taken as evidence that the delegation schemes 
in place are not optimal. Observers may in fact argue that central banks favor nominal 
stability to real stability {0 \ I 0*2 > # i/0 2 )> leading to suboptimal output stabilisation 
but possibly identical degrees of output variability across institutional regimes.
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Concluding Remarks
This chapter has addressed the question whether society benefits from the delegation 
of monetary policy to cautious and conservative central bankers. The framework 
that we have used extends the credibility literature with a more general description 
of preferences and uncertainty. We have made three points. First, the credibility 
problem of monetary policy may be exaggerated if there is multiplicative uncertainty 
about the effectiveness of policy. The tendency of policy makers to err on the side of 
caution creates internal incentives that compensate for the lack of precommitment. 
In principle, uncertainty may therefore improve welfare. We have also highlighted 
an interesting trade-off between uncertainty and weight-conservatism. Second, 
and this is the key insight, the chapter suggests a reconsideration of the role of 
conservatism in the delegation of monetary policy. Previous models have focused on 
suboptimal notions of central-bank conservatism. With a more flexible specification 
of preferences, new notions of conservatism are derived which in principle lead to the 
best feasible equilibrium. Third, the conservative-central-banker approach may not 
be inconsistent with the free lunch result of delegation. In fact, conservatism may 
not only lead to lower inflation but also to a lower variability of output.
We close with some limitations of the model and ideas for future work. For 
reasons of comparability, we preferred to keep with the credibility literature and 
therefore chose the simplest possible description of monetary policy transmission.
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Adding a dynamic structure to the transmission mechanism would be a worthwhile 
extension. Another limitation is that the model features purely exogenous 
transmission uncertainty and that it abstracts from the issue of learning. We have 
not developed the model in this direction. Nevertheless, as suggested by Caplin 
and Leahy (1996), the possibility of learning should be kept in mind, especially if 
systematic search behavior of the policy maker influences the response of the private 
sector to policy. Furthermore, the model may be extended to address the issue of 
transparency. Observers have often argued that transparency is desirable, not so much 
because central banks possess valuable private information about the economy, but 
rather because the public may be uncertain about the preferences of policy makers. 
This chapter suggest another rationale for transparency: transparency clarifies the 
perceptions of policy makers. If the public fully appreciates the uncertainties facing 
the policy maker, average inflation may be lower. Finally, the model abstracts 
from the endogeneity of preferences to economic outcomes. Future work could 
analyze whether the interaction between variability and aversion to variability leads 
to monetary arrangements designed to foster stability in the future.
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A P P E N D IX
The function F(a*) has the following properties:
f ( „) ,  « + * ( ± y  ,
°1
F (+ oo) =  lim F (a m) =  a  +  6a  +  ^ ( a  +  62) x / f . ' j  >
V 1 a*->+oo V 1 1 +  0-2
d F {a ') b2 (a + a2,(a  + b2 ))(a ' + b2)2 (l + <T23 ) 2 / ^ \ 2
3a* (a* +  <r2(a * +  ;,2))4
and
9  ^ =  ^ ( a  +  oKa +  b2)) (a’ +  b2) (l +  ff2 ) 2 x
(a* + b2) ( l  +  a2,) +  b2 x / ± y  > Q
(a* +  <j2 (a* +  62)) 
To prove Proposition 4, rewrite (16) as
«  ee (tt +  a »(a  +  fc2)) (a< +  62)33(1 +  x  f± Y  +  Q -  a* =  0.(a* + o-2(a* + b2)) \ aeJ
Implicit differentiation yields:
da* $
da2 ’
where 4>CT2 and 4>a. are given by:
b2 (1 +  a2) (a* +  b2 ) 3 [(a* -  3a) (1 +  a2) — 2b2 a2\ (  z
d^a ~  (a* + <j2(a* + 62))4 X
_  — Sb2 (a +  a2(a +  b2)) (a* +  b2 ) 2 (1 +  a 2 ) 2
da* (a * +  a 2 {a* +  62))4
a,
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These partial derivatives can be signed as follows:
<^2 a  (a* — 3a) (1 4- cr2a) — 2b2c 
< 0.
Hence,
da* 2 b2 a2- t- t  < 0 <*=> a* < 3a +  s
do-2 1 + a2
which is the condition found in the main text.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Brainard Conservatism Principle 
with Non-Quadratic Objectives
“Academic macroeconomists tend to use quadratic loss functions for 
reasons of mathematical convention, without thinking much about their 
substantive implications. The assumption is not innocuous... I  believe 
that both practical central bankers and academics would benefit from more 
serious thinking about the functional form of the loss function. ” Alan 
Blinder (1997, p. 6)
Introduction
Ever since the inception of the inception of the Tinbergen-Theil framework in the 
1950s, there has been an uneasy acceptance of the quadratic loss function for the 
purpose of analysing monetary policy. Both Tinbergen (1954, pp. 49-51) and Theil 
(1966) themselves were aware of the potential limitations of quadratic losses in terms 
of the description of risk and the lack of robustness of results.20 Brainard (1967),
20 For example, Theil writes (p. 19): “There is no particular reason to assume that the loss function 
should always be quadratic...th[e] asssumption [is a] convenient first approximation. When we try to
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in his realistic extensions21 to the standard framework, recognised this potential 
limitation22, which makes the lack of attention paid in the subsequent literature 
surprising. Moreover, one of the most respected of academics cum policy maker, 
Alan Blinder (1997), has recently asked for a similar consideration, and it is the 
intention of this chapter to provide a response.
This chapter re-examines the celebrated ‘Brainard conservatism principle’ 
(Blinder, 1997, p. 11) under non-quadratic objective functions. This principle 
prescribes that the optimal policy response to a shock (that drives a policy objective 
away from target) should be muted if the economy is subject to multiplicative 
uncertainty. A muted response derives from the policy maker’s concern about not only 
the expected deviation of the objective from target but also the variance of the target 
variable. The Brainard conservatism principle suggests that the policy instrument 
should be moved incompletely and gradually. Incompletely, because the policy maker 
is cautious about generating too much policy-induced variability. Gradually, because
generalise...it appears that the results become much more complicated...it turns out frequently that 
the results become completely unmanageable. This is undoubtedly why the quadratic loss function 
has such a prominent place in several fields...”.
21 See Tobin’s (1990) appreciation of the 1967 Brainard paper.
22Brainard writes (p. 413) that “the assumption of a quadratic is, of course, subject to the 
objection that it treats positive and negative deviations from target as equally important. The use of 
a fancier utility function would provide additional reasons for departing from certainty equivalence.”
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the policy maker prefers to smooth an instantaneous policy change into smaller 
changes over time.
The adoption of quadratic losses would seem to be an important part of the 
Brainard conservatism principle as the quadratic suggests a particular, and possibly 
perverse, attitude to risk. One where, for example, the policy maker is indifferent 
^between a one-period undershoot of a particular inflation objective by 4% and a four- 
period overshoot by 2% (assuming, of course, that there is no discounting). Also, 
the use of the quadratic involves the implicit assumption of symmetry and it is worth 
examining how possible asymmetries would interact with the presence of additive and 
multiplicative uncertainty.
It seems quite plausible that if the characterisation of the policy maker’s 
behaviour were made in a more appealing manner than quadratic utility then 
the specific generation of the Brainard conservatism principle, in response to 
multiplicative uncertainty alone, may be overturned. In fact, much recent work 
in both consumption theory and applied finance has involved examining of the 
integration of newer concepts of utility to older pricing puzzles.23 Again, given the 
influence of this healthy literature it is surprising how little impact this has made on 
the analysis of optimal policy. And it is the examination of the robustness of the
23 See Deaton (1992) for recent developments in consumption and Shiller (1998) for a signpost to 
the next generation of applied finance work in the non-expected utility paradigm.
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Brainard conservatism principle to the deviations from quadratic losses that will be 
the focus of this chapter.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 examines the impact 
on the optimal interest rule when the loss function reflects constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA) in the face of additive uncertainty, and by analogy other classes 
of risk aversion (such as CRRA). Section 2 examines the impact on the optimal 
interest rate rule of both additive and multiplicative uncertainty when preferences 
are asymmetric. Section 3 analyses simulations of the resulting optimal rules in four 
different cases and provides a graphical general solution to the time path of interest 
and inflation rates following an inflation shock. The last section offers concluding 
remarks, discusses some implications for the optimal delegation of monetary policy 
and suggests some possible further work.
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1. Deviations from Quadratics: Other A ttitudes to  Risk
The Brainard conservatism principle arises due to the interaction of multiplicative 
uncertainty with quadratic preferences. Alternatively, one could take the view that 
the resulting smoothing of interest rates is simply caused by a form of risk aversion 
(with respect to inflation volatility) other than the one implied by quadratics. For 
example, in terms of risk, two well-known properties of the quadratic are that the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion equals unity and that its third derivative is zero: 
the former implies that the elasticity of the policy maker’s marginal loss with respect 
to inflation is always 1 and the latter implies that the variability of inflation does 
not affect marginal loss. The use of non-quadratics might be analogous to agents 
smoothing consumption in response to temporary income shocks. One might expect 
that the introduction of loss functions which deliver such smoothing in a consumption 
setting will also produce interest rate gradualism in a setting of monetary policy 
making. This is, however, not necessarily true. It is shown below that caution 
and gradualism may not follow from non-quadratic preferences as long as losses are 
symmetric and uncertainty is simply additive.
1.1. The Framework
Consider the following simple control problem:
min Q = Eq
WtS
+oo
6 t+1L (7Tt + i ;  7T*)
t=0
(1)
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subject to
7Tt+i -  7T = a (7Tt  -  7r) -  b (it - i) +  et+l (2)
with et+i ~  A(0,<72), i.i.d., and where 7r*, 7r and 7r* refer respectively to the inflation 
rate at time t, the unconditional mean of inflation and the socially optimal rate of 
inflation; 6 is the discount factor; a measures the persistence of the inflation process; 
b is the policy multiplier; it — i captures the deviation of the policy instrument from 
its natural level; et+i is an additive shock at time t + 1.
Equations (1) and (2) tell us that the policy maker sets a path of interest rates 
such that future deviations of inflation from its target are minimised subject to an 
inflation relationship and a particular specification of preferences. The reduced-form 
process for inflation in (2) is kept deliberately simple as the emphasis of this framework 
is on the specification of the preferences of the policy maker.24 The minimal features 
we require are persistence in inflation (ensuring a role for policy) and uncertainty 
(of the additive and later the multiplicative form). Inflation is described as an 
autoregressive process with a long-run mean equal to 7r. Inflationary persistence 
is captured by parameter a where 0 < a < 1. As well as the additive shock, et+i, 
inflation can be influenced by deviations of the policy instrument i t from its neutral
24In a model that does incorporate a private sector with forward-looking expectations, the 
sluggishness in Equation (2) could be derived from the existence of nominal rigidities caused by 
menu costs or overlapping contracts.
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level i. For convenience, we assume throughout that i — 0. Policy multiplier b (where 
b > 0) translates policy actions into inflation outcomes and is assumed to be non­
stochastic in this section. The only source of uncertainty is the additive shock, et+i, 
which is normal and i.i.d. with mean 0 and variance o\. Note that the instrument 
is set at the beginning of each period, whereas the shock occurs at the end of each 
period. As a result, a shock has one-for-one first-round effects on inflation during
the current period, but stabilisation policy can offset its second-round effects in
subsequent periods. Finally, the intertemporal loss function in (1) consists of the 
infinitely discounted sum of per-period losses L  (7rt+1; 7r*). Discount factor 6  takes 
some value between 0 and 1.
Let us now turn to the specification of the per-period loss function. Natural 
candidates for a richer description of the policy makers behaviour towards risk would 
be the exponential (or CARA) and the isoelastic (or CRRA) loss functions:
Lcara (7rt+i; 71"*) =  exp [0 (7rt+i -  tt*)] -  1 (3)
where 0  > 0, and
Lm  (iTi+u **) =  (1 +  • - ,r*)1 P~ 1 (4)1 -  p
where p > 0 but p ^  1, and
LCTTa (Kt+lX)  =  In (1 +  7T(+1 -  TT*) (4’)
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for p =  1. As the name suggests, the CARA loss function is characterised by constant 
absolute risk aversion (equal to /?), whereas CRRA implies constant relative risk 
aversion (equal to p). Recall that quadratic losses,
Lq (7Tt + 1 ; 7T*) =  - 7r‘+ 1  ~  7r* ^ 2 ,
imply increasing absolute risk aversion.
In order to substantiate our claim that symmetric non-quadratic preferences 
(and thus other descriptions of risk aversion than implied by the simple quadratic) 
may not deliver policy-caution or policy-gradualism per se, we will focus subsequently, 
without loss of generality, on the CARA loss function.
There is however one important caveat before proceeding. In the consumption 
literature, smoothing occurs due to the interaction between risk aversion and 
an intertemporal budget constraint ensuring an intertemporal trade-off between 
consumption today and consumption in the future. In the Tinbergen-Theil setting, 
however, there is no natural constraint on the inter-temporal behaviour of inflation 
- higher inflation does not necessarily imply lower inflation tomorrow. Due to 
the absence of a properly defined resource constraint, optimisation under CARA 
preferences will yield unrealistic solutions for the setting of interest rates. If the 
inflation target were for example equal to zero, optimality would require the interest 
rate to be set at plus infinity because the resulting negative rates of inflation imply 
policy gains. While the introduction of an output term in the loss function could
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certainly offset some of this perverse tendency, we have opted for a modification of 
the CARA function such that it incorporates the concept of a target. This will also 
allow for a more natural and direct comparison with the quadratic paradigm.
1.2. The Optimal Interest Rule
We now introduce the symmetric two-part CARA loss function:
!exp [ -/?! (7Tt+i -  7T*) ] -  1 for 7Tm  < 7T* (5)
exp [P2 (7Tt+1 — tt*) ] — 1 otherwise 
where we impose (31 =  (32 =  P f°r symmetry. This two-part function is displayed in 
Figure 1. Using the indicator function, the loss function can be re-written as follows:
L (7rt+1; 7r*) =  It+i exp [ -(3 (7rm  -  7r*) ]
+  (1 — It+l) exp [ (3 (7Ti+i — 7T*) ] -  1 , (6)
where Im  takes the value 1 for inflation draws below target (nt+i < ^*) and 0 for 
draws above. Equation (1) can therefore be re-written as:
+00
W J2
“ in Ea V ' <5‘+1 It+1 exp [ -/3  -  w*) ]
J  1 + O O t=0
+ 0 0
+  E0 ^ 2  St+1 ( I - I t + i ) e x p [ P  (w t+ i-  tt*) ] -  1 (7)
t=0
As a result of the simple dynamic structure in Equation (2), the multi-period 
control problem in (7) can be reduced to a series of one-period problems.
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FIGURE 1
A Symmetric Two-Part CARA Loss Function
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The decision problem at time t is therefore given by:
min Et { It+i exp [ -/3 (fr +  a (7rt -  tt) -  bit +  e«+i — tt*) ] }
n
+ Et { { l - I t + i )  exp[(3 (tt +  a (tt* -  7f) -  6zt +  ei+1 -  tt*) ] } -  1 (8)
where i has been conveniently set to 0.
In order to evaluate the probability of the additive shock being on one side of 
the split-distribution or the other, we need to examine the probability of the inflation 
draw being greater or less than the current period inflation rate being less than or
equal to the target. For notational convenience, let X t denote tt* — it — a (ret — it)+bit.
The expectations over the indicator functions axe then given by:
Et [It+1) =  Pr [e(+1 < X t] =  $
Et [1 -  / (+1] =  Pr [et+1 > X t] =  l - $  , (9)
where $(•) is the cumulative density of N(0,1), the standard normal. The argument 
in (8) then becomes:
$  (  J  e x P  \P (X t ~  e * + i)]  0  (et+1) det + 1
—oo
+oo
+ J  esxp[P(-Xt + et+i)\<t>{et+1)det+i (10)
xt
where </>(•) is the probability density of the standard normal. Note that expectations 
are taken over the intervals [—oo, X t] and [Xt, H-oo] respectively. Evaluating Equation
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(1 0 ) gives us:
*  ®  *  (pa ,  + exp ( £ £  +  0 * , )
+  ( u )
Because of global convexity of (5) we can see that this function attains its global 
minimum when X t equals 0 , i.e. when interest rates are set to close the gap between 
current inflation and target completely and immediately. To sum up, we have:
X t =  0 it =  ^  (7Tt -  7t) +  i  (7f -  7T*) . (12)
The expression in (12) is exactly the same as the one obtained under quadratic 
losses. It says that the deviation of the optimal interest rate from its neutral level 
(recall that the neutral level has been set to zero here) is a function of two components. 
The first component is essentially a simple feedback rule, implying that the interest 
rate response depends on how far last period’s inflation was away from its long-run 
mean. The second component derives from the possibility that the inflation target 
does not necessarily correspond with the long-run mean of the autoregressive inflation 
process. If the inflation target is such that inflation will have to be sustained above 
(below) its long-run level, then interest rates need to be permanently lower (higher). 
Note that when the inflation target coincides with the unconditional mean of the 
inflation process, then the optimal rule is simply given by i t =  (a /6) (7rt — 7f).
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From (12) an important (and well-known) conclusion can be derived for the 
making of monetary policy: deviations from quadratics do not affect the optimal rule 
as long as the loss function is symmetric and uncertainty is additive. Interest rates 
will still be set so as to offset completely any shock to inflation last period. This result 
goes back to the work of Tinbergen (1952) and Theil (1964,1966) on optimal control 
theory in simple linear models, which can be further generalized for any symmetric loss 
function and any symmetric shock distribution. In an econometric context, Granger 
(1969), has shown that the conditional mean (leading to the optimal rule described 
above) continues to be the optimal predictor under more general conditions. The 
results therefore imply that richer descriptions of risk aversion (to that implied by 
quadratic losses) are irrelevant if the maintained hypothesis of additive uncertainty 
and symmetric preferences is not violated. To put it differently, risk aversion merely 
affects dead-weight losses.
Recall that nothing can be done about the first-round effects of an additive 
shock to inflation. Only the second-round effects to the next, and subsequent, period’s 
inflation rate can be stabilised. We have shown that stabilisation will be complete 
and immediate: there is no element of policy-caution or policy-gradualism. This is 
what is meant with risk aversion, per se, being irrelevant for the optimal rule.
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Of course, the extent of risk aversion is not irrelevant for the value of the loss, 
which equals:
\ i ^ +  J  $  (e*+ i) de«+i^ exp  (13)
if the optimal policy is implemented. Note that the value of the loss in (13) increases 
both with the level of additive variability (cre) and the extent of the policy maker’s 
aversion to risk (/?). Intuitively, an increase in risk aversion, for example, means 
that a particular level of additive variability becomes more costly as the first-round 
inflationary effects cannot be undone. As a result, at the time that the policy maker 
can act upon the shock (i.e. the next period), the loss has occurred and is dead-weight. 
Note the analogy with finance theory: choosing a risk aversion parameter may alter 
the price of risk but as additive uncertainty is uncorrelated with policy risk, there is 
no impact on the insurable quantity of risk. This means that the optimal plan does 
not alter.
1.3. Caution and Gradualism
Introducing multiplicative uncertainty (about multiplier b) affects the optimal rule 
since certainty-equivalence no longer holds. The reason is simply that the actions of 
the policy maker bring about an additional source of variability into the loss function.
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Thus, the dead-weight loss argument no longer applies. As in the quadratic case, this 
will make optimal policy cautious and gradualist.
In a framework with symmetric preferences and both additive and 
multiplicative uncertainty there are now two interactions going on. First of all, 
there is the earlier result that for a given level of additive variability risk aversion 
increases the dead-weight losses due to first-round effects on inflation. This does not 
affect, however, the optimal rule. Second, risk aversion will amplify the costs from 
a given degree of multiplicative uncertainty, when the policy maker tries to stabilise 
the second-round effects on inflation. The more risk averse the policy maker is, the 
more cautious and gradualist policy will be.25 In contrast to the interaction between 
risk aversion and additive variability, risk aversion will not affect the dead-weight 
losses through the multiplicative uncertainty channel because this channel operates 
when interest rates are moved. Since in this model interest rate actions tomorrow 
cannot offset the first-round effects on inflation today, risk aversion does not amplify 
the dead-weight losses through this mechanism.
The split-CARA framework becomes analytically untractable when 
multiplicative uncertainty is introduced. But, in any case, the framework has served 
our purpose, in that we show formally that risk aversion is irrelevant in a setting 
of additive variability and symmetric preferences. If one wishes to examine issues
25The consequences of risk aversion for caution in the setting of the policy instrument have been 
discussed in Chapter 1, where we introduced the generalised quadratic objective function.
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of policy-caution and policy-gradualism, it seems that non-quadratic symmetric 
preferences (and their implications for risk aversion), per se, are not sufficient. 
Moreover, they are not necessary as one can easily examine these issues in a quadratic 
framework.
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2. Deviations from Quadratics: Asym m etry
The quadratic paradigm is sometimes criticised because positive and negative 
deviations from the target are treated symmetrically. In this section, we explore 
the implications arising from the assumption of asymmetric losses in a setting of 
monetary policy making. The analysis will show that a non-quadratic loss function 
around a particular target may be observationally similar to a quadratic loss function 
around a different target, even if we allow for a rich description of the stochastic 
nature of the economy.
Asymmetric losses may be an interesting way of characterising the policy 
maker’s attitude to policy outcomes, if  such attitudes reflect either (i) a view about 
the social welfare function or (ii) an exogenous view of the policy maker about the 
embarrassment costs of positive as compared to negative deviations from target or 
both. Note that even though the latter political economy line of thought may not 
be applicable to goal dependent inflation-targeting central banks with a symmetric 
inflation remit, the possibility remains that the government, when determining the 
level of the inflation target, has taken into account possible asymmetries to the social 
cost of inflation. As a consequence, the level of a symmetric inflation target may 
internalise possible asymmetries in the social cost of deviations of inflation from that 
target.
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Varian (1975), in his discussion on the losses faced by property valuers, 
suggests an asymmetric loss function which rises linearly on one side of zero and 
rises exponentially on the other side.26 It is this loss function, the so-called LINEX 
(Linear Exponential), which we employ to examine the impact of both additive and 
multiplicative uncertainty on the optimal path of interest rates.27
2.1. Introducing the LINEX Function
Varian (1975) introduced the following convex loss function:
L(x) = a  exp (7 0 :) — (3x — a  (14)
where a > 0, f3 > 0 and 7  ^  0. Let x  be the deviation of the policy objective from 
target.28 We can see that L(0) =  0 and that for a minimum to exist at x  =  0 we
26The argument used by Varian was that underassessment of property values led to approximately 
linear losses whereas overassessment may result in appeals, litigation and other costs. Zellner (1986) 
suggests an even clearer example by pointing out that in the construction of dams underestimations 
of peak flows is much more serious than overestimation.
27The results that we obtain with this particular asymmetric objective function can be easily 
generalized to other asymmetric objective functions. For example, if uncertainty is merely additive, 
Granger (1969) has shown that, for any asymmetric loss function and for a normal shock distribution, 
the optimal predictor will equal the conditional mean plus an additive term.
28In a related vein, Christofferson and Diebold (1997) study the optimal prediction problem under 
general asymmetric loss functions.
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FIGURE 2 
LINEX and Quadratic Losses Compared
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must have 7 a  =  /? .29 Equation (14) can therefore be re-written as:
L(x) = a  [exp ('yx) -  7 2 ; -  1] , (15)
where a > 0  and 7  7  ^0 .
Note that 7  determines the extent of the asymmetry in the LINEX function 
and that a scales the losses. Figure 2 shows the LINEX function for a  =  1 and for 
7  =  0.5,1.0,1.5. For comparison the quadratic losses are also plotted. The x-axis 
plots the deviation x. Note that for small losses the difference between the LINEX 
and quadratic appear small and, in fact, if we expand exp (7 2 ) =  1 +  j x  +   ^(7 a;)2 , 
we find that L (x) — \  (7 a;)2 . But, of course, for larger values of x, the differences 
in losses become more substantial. Appendix A discusses some related points on the 
LINEX function.
2.2. The Optimal Interest Rule
The intertemporal maximisation problem with policy being subject to asymmetric 
preferences and both additive and multiplicative instrument uncertainty can be 
summarised as:
min Cl — Eq
W tS
+00
^ V + 1 L (  7Tt + r,7T*)
t=0
(16)
29This is simply found by differentiating (14) with respect to x and solving for ft.
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with
l ' ( ’rt + i ; 0  = e x p [ 7  (tt(+i - tt*)] - 7  (ttj+i tt*) -  1, (17)
where 7  > 0 , subject to:
7rt+ 1 — 7f = a (r’t — 7r) — + et+i ,
and
\bt+i ~ N
f - \b
>
f . ;  . ]
et+i J K 0 )  ^ °  )
Note that we also have 0 < a < l , 6 > 0  and bt+ 1 and et+i i.i.d.
The preferences of the policy maker are described by the LINEX loss 
function. If for some reason overshooting the inflation target (n*) is more costly 
than undershooting it, we can restrict 7  to be strictly positive. This will imply that 
undershooting is penalised in an approximately linear fashion, whereas the marginal 
losses from overshooting are increasing in next period’s inflation rate. Of course, the 
following analysis could also be completed for the case where negative deviations imply 
exponential losses and positive deviations imply linear losses. But for the remainder 
of this chapter, we require, without loss of generality, 7  to be strictly positive.
The aim of the exercise is to find the optimal interest rate path which will 
minimise the intertemporal loss function subject to the relationships in the above 
equations. Note that control is imperfect due to both additive and multiplicative
Chapter Two 95
uncertainty. Both sources of uncertainty are assumed to follow a normal distribution 
and to be independent from each other (i.e. crbe =  0). The parameter of inflation 
persistence is assumed to be a known constant.
As to the precise nature of the uncertaintyj the authorities may believe that 
the parameters of the model are random variables with a particular positive variance. 
Alternatively, they may regard the true (population) parameter values as being non- 
random quantities in the underlying model but put some margin of error on their 
estimated (sample) values. In what follows, we assume that the underlying additive 
shocks are genuine random variables (which will ensure a role for stabilisation policy) 
and that the multiplicative uncertainty derives from imperfect inference (which will 
deliver a cautious and gradualist setting of policy) .30
Again, the multi-period control problem can be conveniently reduced to a 
series of one-period problems. The decision problem at date t is then given by:
min Et { exp [ 7  (ft +  a (7rt -  7f) -  bt+iit +  em  -  n*) ] }it
-  E t { 7  (tt +  a (7Tt -  Tt) -  bt+iit +  et+1 -  tt*) } -  1 (18)
30For a discussion, see Brainard (1967, p. 413-4). The assumption that multiplicative uncertainty 
derives from estimation error is made for mathematical convenience. Note that, in Chapter 1, we 
assumed that multiplicative shocks are genuinely random.
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subject to
\
bt+i
~  N
b
)
,  \  aj 0
et+1 J  ^ ° a'  )
The first-order condition of this optimisation problem implicitly defines the 
optimal interest rate setting:
a / _\ 1 7 <j {H =  j  ( * - * ) . +
The mathematical derivation of this expression is referred to Appendix B.
It is analytically impossible to get a reduced-form solution for the optimal 
rule in this general case. However, there are some interesting simple special cases.
Special Case 1. Symmetry and No Multiplicative Uncertainty ( 7  —> 0 and al = 0).
If the preferences of the policy maker tend to symmetry and there is no multiplicative 
instrument uncertainty, then the optimal rule collapses to:
U =  - (vr*  — 7f) +  i ( 7 f  — t t* ) .  (20)
b b
This corresponds to the result that was also obtained in the previous section. 
To interpret this expression, assume that a one-off additive shock has occurred at 
time t, producing an overshooting of the inflation target by x% points. Nothing can 
be done about the initial boost in inflation, but as long as there is some persistence
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in inflation (a > 0 ), the second-round effects of the shock to inflation at time t +  1 
(another deviation from the inflation target by ax% points) will be frilly neutralised.
Special Case 2 . Asymmetry and No Multiplicative Uncertainty ( 7  >  0 and =  0).
If preferences are asymmetric and there is no multiplicative uncertainty, the optimal 
rule is given by:
it = = f a  -  ff) +  i  (jf -  TT*) +  (21)
The asymmetry assumption produces an upward bias in the optimal rule if 
overshooting is considered to be more costly than undershooting. It is clear that 
the interest rate ‘premium’ due to risk aversion increases with the extent of additive 
variability as well as with the degree of asymmetry in the preferences of the policy 
maker.
Special Case 3. Symmetry and Multiplicative Uncertainty ( 7  —► 0 and > 0).
If preferences approach symmetry and there is multiplicative uncertainty, then 
L’Hdpital’s rule delivers the optimal rule:
H = / 7 \  2
a / _ v l y   * 1-  {7Tt ~  TT) +  -  (7T -  7T ) (22)
1 +  (<Tb/b)'
The derivation is found in Appendix C. This expression corresponds to Brainard’s 
result (1967, p. 414) that one would obtain under quadratic losses. If the coefficient 
of variation (crb/b) exceeds zero, the optimal interest rate response will be such that 
the gap with the inflation target is not entirely closed.
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We can also solve for the long-run steady-state values of inflation and interest 
rates. This will be illustrated for Special Cases 1 and 3 (default and uncertainty), 
where there is no asymmetry. Analytically, Equations (20) and (2 2 ) need to be 
matched with the steady-state condition:
A _  1 / , XI =  — (tt -  tt) (23)
which follows from Equation (2).
For the default case (Special Case 1 ), the steady-state values for the inflation 
and interest rate are respectively:
tts s  =  tt* (24)
iss = r*-7f) .  (24’)
b
Inflation thus settles down at the inflation target and, unless the long-run 
mean is equal to the inflation target, policy is continually non-neutral (iss ^  0).
For the uncertainty case (Special Case 3), the steady state ceui be
characterised by:
7rss = Xtr* +  (1 — X)tt (25)
aX — 1
i s s  =  1
T \ 2
where
1 +  (ab/b)
A =  1
{ tt* —  tt) (25’)
1 -I- (1  -  a) (ab/b) 2 •
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Equation (25) shows that the long-run steady state in the uncertainty case 
can be represented as a weighted average of the long-run mean of the inflation process 
and the inflation target. If there is no multiplicative uncertainty, then A equals 1 (as 
&1 =  0) and long-run inflation will hit the inflation target. The other extreme is the 
case of infinite multiplicative uncertainty which delivers A equal to 0 (as <r\ —► + 0 0 ) 
and a long-run inflation rate which reverts to the long-run mean of the process. 
Similarly, Equation (25) shows that the degree of activism is inversely related to the 
degree of multiplicative uncertainty This is what we mean with policy-caution in 
this particular setting: because of multiplicative uncertainty, the long-run response 
in interest rate is biased towards its neutral level; as a result, inflation will settle down 
closer to its mean. Note as well that if the long-run mean and the inflation target 
coincide, then the issue of caution entirely evaporates: inflation settles down at its 
target and interest rates at their neutral level.
Returning to the most general case (i.e. multiplicative instrument uncertainty 
and asymmetric preferences), note that the last two terms in Equation (19) result from 
the introduction of multiplicative uncertainty into the asymmetry case. An interesting 
issue is to what extent these terms lead to substantially different results compared 
to the introduction of such uncertainty in the default case. In order to answer this 
question let us turn to some simulation results.
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3. Simulation Results
Section 2  derived expressions for the general form of the optimal rule, Equation (19), 
and for three relevant special cases: Case 1 being the default case (D), Case 2  the 
asymmetry case (A) and Case 3 the uncertainty case (U). This section examines 
numerically the implication of the optimal rule for the setting of interest rates both 
as a static first-period choice and as a dynamic path. We are also able to derive 
graphically the solution to the choice of optimal interest rates for all four cases. The 
final result allows us to answer the question of whether asymmetric preferences are 
sufficient to deliver gradualist interest rate responses and whether cautious interest 
rate responses are delivered.
For expositional purposes, we have made one modification to the general 
expression in Equation (19): the long-run mean of the inflation process has been set 
to zero (i.e. 7f =  0). This will give further insights on the interaction between a 
long-run mean and an inflation target, which are not necessarily equal.
3.1. The Initial Interest Rate Response
Figure 3 examines the initial interest rate response to inflation shocks under the four 
cases. The size of inflation shocks (on the x-axis) is allowed to vary from -10% to 
+ 1 0 % and the choice of optimal interest rates in the first period is shown on the 
y-axis.
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FIGURE 3
Initial Interest Rate Responses to Inflation Shocks
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We chose the following parameter values for the simulations: 7  =  1.5, a =  0.5, 
b =  1 , 7z* =  2.5, (jg =  0.05 and =  0.5. This parameter choice is explained 
as follows: as 7  is the extent of asymmetry in the loss function, which tends to 
symmetry as 7  —> 0 , a value of 1.5 from Figure 2  would seem a fair degree of 
asymmetry. Parameter a is the extent of non-policy related inflation persistence in the 
economy and is set to be something below the observed persistence - which includes 
policy reaction - typically found for modern industrialised economies.31 Parameter b 
measures the mean impact on inflation of an interest movement and is set to allow for 
full pass through. Further, 77*  has been set equal to the inflation target of the Bank 
of England and is the variance of additive shocks, which is set to a small number 
less than (the variance of multiplicative uncertainty). This will ensure that the 
state-independent bias in interest rates (the third term on the r.h.s. of Equation 
(19)) does not swamp the interaction terms between asymmetry and multiplicative 
uncertainty (the last two terms in Equation (19)).
Figure 3 shows that, for this range of single inflation draws, the optimal 
initial interest rate response rises linearly in the value of the inflation draw. The 
initial interest rate response rises at the rate a/b in both the default and asymmetry 
cases, at rate a / (b+al/b) in the uncertainty case and at approximately the same rate
31 The estimated sample persistence post-Bretton Woods has been in the order of 0.5 — 1.0 for 
OECD countries. Of course, the non-policy related persistence parameter will in the real world 
include some expectation of likely policy accommodation.
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in the general case. We find that in both the default and uncertainty case the optimal 
initial interest rate response from a five percent inflation draw is zero but that in both 
the asymmetry and the general case, reflecting the asymmetry bias, an optimal initial 
interest rate response of zero occurs when the inflation draw is n*/a — jcrl/(2a). This 
means that in comparison to the symmetric cases the optimal initial interest rate 
response with an inflation draw equal to target is biased up by an intercept amount 
of 7 <jg/ (26) in the asymmetry case but something less in the general case because of 
the interaction between risk aversion and uncertainty. This is reflected by the last 
two terms in Equation (19).32
What happens to the initial interest rate choice under increasing parameter 
uncertainty? Figure 4 examines the initial response of interest rates to a given 10% 
inflation shock when the variance of 6 - the extent of multiplicative uncertainty - is 
allowed to increase from 0 to the implausible level of 2.33 For obvious reasons, the 
initial interest response is state-independent of the level of multiplicative uncertainty 
in both default and asymmetry cases. The introduction of multiplicative uncertainty 
makes the initial response of the optimal interest rule in the general case similar to 
the default case when the variance of 6 is set at 1.5. One way of thinking about
32Note again that, for convenience, we have assumed that the inflation target exceeds the long-run 
mean of inflation.
33 For a value of b equal to 1, a variance of 2 may be considered to be implausible because there 
would be an approximately 20% chance of an increase in interest rates leading to a perverse response 
in inflation.
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this result (if there is agreement on the other parameters) is to argue that if the policy 
maker thinks that the optimal initial step in interest rates following a 1 0 % inflation 
shock is 2.5%, they either live in a default world or a general world with relatively 
large multiplicative uncertainty. Also note that if multiplicative uncertainty rises to 
implausibly large levels (i.e. greater than 2 ) then the initial interest rate response 
looks similar for the uncertainty and general cases. Or, if the policy maker considers 
that the economic structure is chronically uncertain with other factors tending to be 
outweighed, the initial interest rate response will tend to zero.34
3.2. The Dynamic Interest Rate Path
We are now ready to solve for the dynamic path of interest rates (and simultaneously 
for inflation) following the calculation of the initial response. We assume that the 
inflation rate is the beginning of period rate and the interest rate is the end of period 
rate. Following the initial inflation draw (7rt) and optimal interest rate response (it), 
the economy’s inflation relationship, Equation (2) with it =  i =  0, delivers a new 
inflation level (7rt+1). This in turn leads to a second optimal interest rate response 
(if+i) and so on until the steady-state values axe reached.
34This is analogous to the Friedman (1951) argument for what might be termed as ‘policy 
passivism’.
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FIGURE 5a 
Impulse Response Paths of Interest Rates
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Figure 5a plots the response of interest rates over time to an inflation shock 
of 10% under the four cases. The first point to note is that the level of steady state 
interest rates is different in the four cases and so then is the steady-state inflation rate 
(or implied target) . 35 Second, note that in the default and asymmetry cases interest 
rates return to their steady-state path at the end of the second period. In other 
words, there is no gradualism. In the two cases involving uncertainty the return to 
the steady state occurs by the end of the fourth period - i.e. it is gradualist. Finally, 
as long as the long-run mean of the inflation process is not equal to the inflation 
target, the gradualist response also delivers one which is cautious, in the sense that 
the long-run steady-state value of the interest rate will be closer to its neutral level.
Figure 5b plots the dynamic response of interest rates and inflation to a 10% 
inflation shock in the default and general cases where the explicit inflation target has 
been set to 2.5%. For the default case, in the absence of gradualism, interest rates 
and inflation arrive at their steady-state values after one period.36 In the general 
case, the economy is close to its steady-state at the end of the fourth period. In the 
general case, because of both uncertainty and risk aversion, the LINEX loss function 
forces the optimal policy maker to drive the economy towards a lower inflation target
35Note from the discussion in Section 3 that the implicit target is identical in the default and 
uncertainty case if the explicit inflation target (n*) equals the long-run mean of inflation (ff).
36Interest rates are a negative deviation from base in this example because the inflation target is 
set above the zero long-run mean of inflation.
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than explicitly stated. It is this implicit modification to the explicit target, down to 
some —1% in this case, and to the long-run mean projected by the economy’s inflation 
relationship in Equation (2) which leads to the negative bias in the long-run inflation 
rate and the analogous positive bias to interest rates.
3.3. T he G raphical Solution
Figure 6  plots a graphical solution to the simulations presented in Figures 3-5, namely 
the steady-state locus and the initial interest rate response. From the steady-state 
solution to Equation (2), we find that the steady-state locus passes through the origin 
with slope (a — 1 )/b and cuts the initial interest rate responses at the steady state 
locus of inflation and interest rates. This means for the four cases shown that the 
default, uncertainty, general and asymmetry cases imply successively lower inflation 
targets and higher steady-state interest rate. Just as the dynamic paths in Figure 4 
showed different steady-state interest rates, Figure 6  shows the same steady-state in 
inflation/interest rate space. The rankings of the implied inflation targets in terms of 
their deviations from default case are parameter dependent but from Figure 6  we are 
able to say that, for positive asymmetry, (i) the non-default cases have lower implied 
inflation targets and (ii) the implied inflation target for the general case will always 
be lower than that for the uncertainty case.
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Figure 7 plots the dynamic response of interest rates in the inflation/interest 
rate space. To find the dynamic response to an initial inflation draw, a vertical 
fine is displayed from the inflation draw to the initial interest rate response for one 
of the four cases. This vertical line shows the jump variable property of interest 
rates in the first period. In the cases without multiplicative uncertainty the next step 
(indicated by a little arrow) is the final one and represents the move back to the steady- 
state locus. In the cases involving uncertainty, the next steps involve exponentially 
decaying movements along the initial response fine back to the steady-state locus 
(this is visualised by the periodic intersection of the arrow with the relevant response 
path). From the graph we can also see that the gradualist response is cautious: the 
intersection of the response path and the steady-state locus is closer to the origin 
when there is multiplicative uncertainty.
So why is the inflation target lower in the non-default case? There are three 
separate reasons. The easiest way is to first examine the move from the default 
case, with no multiplicative uncertainty, to the uncertainty case, we can see that 
arithmetically the bias follows from the (squared) coefficient of variation in the 
denominator. Intuitively, this means that the lack of perfect control over the economy 
makes the optimal policy maker choose to base interest rate decisions around an 
implicit inflation target somewhat lower than the explicit inflation target. Because the 
long-run mean of inflation embedded in the Phillips curve relationship is not identical 
to that of the explicit inflation target, the achievement of the inflation target actually
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requires some policy initiative towards which, in the presence of control uncertainty, 
the policy maker minimises expected losses by aiming too low.
Second, if we introduce asymmetry to the default case, this creates a bias to 
the explicit inflation target because losses due to positive deviations axe magnified 
and the rational policy maker is able to mitigate them by aiming for a point that is 
smaller than the minimum of the LINEX function.
Finally, combining asymmetry and multiplicative uncertainty in the general 
case increases, for the parameters chosen, the inflation target. This is because of 
two separate effects: (i) the dichotomy between the explicit inflation target and the 
economy’s long-run inflation mean mitigates the policy action in the asymmetry case 
and (ii) the tendency of the policy maker to choose neutral policy in the presence 
of uncertain control over the economy. For the cases involving uncertainty the lower 
inflation target results in interest rate smoothing which, with cautious responses, 
delivers lower inflation. This is so because the interest rate response is in two periods 
given the persistence of inflation. In the asymmetry case, the lower inflation target 
simply implies an activist setting of the first-period interest rate.
The main impact of asymmetric preferences is not to over-turn the Brainard 
conservatism principle. It is still parameter (or what we might to think of as control) 
uncertainty that leads to gradual responses. With either symmetric or asymmetric 
preferences, risk aversion in itself does not deliver smoothing when shocks are additive. 
We can find biases in interest rate setting for additive, as well as multiplicative
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uncertainty, in the case of asymmetric preferences. But these seem to occur in a 
very Brainard way - the implicit quadratic is simply shifted aside.
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C oncluding  R em arks
This chapter re-examines the Brainard conservatism principle under non-quadratic 
policy objective functions. We deviate from the quadratic framework in the following 
two respects. First, while keeping with the assumption of symmetry, we examine the 
optimal interest rule that is obtained when the policy maker’s preferences are given by 
a split constant absolute risk aversion function. In contrast to the simple quadratic, 
the split-CARA allows us to flexibly parameterise risk aversion and thereby change 
the curvature of the objective function. Second, we examine the consequences of 
asymmetric policy preferences for the optimal interest rule. This is achieved with a 
linear exponential objective function that allows us to parameterise the asymmetry 
in a straightforward fashion.
Changing the curvature of a symmetric loss function - for example, by 
introducing constant absolute (or relative) risk aversion - is shown not to matter for 
the optimal rule as long as uncertainty is additive. As a result, certainty equivalence 
also applies to non-quadratic loss functions provided that these are symmetric. So if 
the uncertainty is additive, deviating from quadratics does not buy us anything new: 
the optimal rule remains the same, and only the policy maker’s dead-weight losses 
are different.
As with the quadratic case under additive uncertainty, welfare losses will be 
minimised at an inflation rate set equal to target. And so it continues to make
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sense to hit this target as soon and as closely as possible: there will thus be no 
case for gradualism or caution. In order to examine gradualism and caution, non­
quadratic preferences, per se, are not sufficient as one needs to introduce multiplicative 
uncertainty. Moreover, non-quadratic preferences are not necessary as one can easily 
examine these issues in a quadratic framework. This brings us to the conclusion 
that the analytically convenient assumption of quadratic losses may not be that 
unreasonable after all.
When we introduce an asymmetry in the loss function (with a LINEX 
function) we find that the optimal interest rate rule is biased in a state-independent 
way, if uncertainty is merely additive. Asymmetric preferences then result in an 
interest rate path which is equivalent to that implied by a shifted quadratic loss 
function. If upward risks are considered more (less) costly than downward risks, then 
the minimum of the quadratic loss function is smaller (larger) than that of the non­
quadratic. In our framework, this means that the implied inflation target (which 
internalises the asymmetry) is smaller (larger) than the stated target.
With multiplicative uncertainty, the asymmetry does not yield qualitatively 
different conclusions from changing the curvature of a symmetric loss function: 
gradualism and caution only obtain when uncertainty is multiplicative. Moreover, 
simulations of the optimal rule under asymmetry and multiplicative uncertainty show 
that the interest rate paths are very similar to those implied by a shifted quadratic. As 
for caution, we have also established that multiplicative uncertainty is not sufficient.
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An additional requirement is that long-run policy interventions are necessary. This 
latter feature is illustrated in our rather simple model by letting the inflation target 
and the long-run mean of the inflation process differ.
With reference to the delegation of monetary policy, the use of asymmetric 
loss functions leads to a number of important insights. First of all, if the government 
requires the central bank to be goal dependent, then the central bank should also 
be required to pursue the delegated goal in a symmetric way. This result is 
consistent with the inflation remits of many central banks operating in inflation- 
targeting regimes. Second, if there is, for some social welfare or political economy 
reason, an asymmetry in the loss function of the government, this need not require 
the loss function of the central bank to be asymmetric as well. The asymmetry 
in the government’s loss function would simply increase or decrease the mandated 
target (depending on the nature of the asymmetry) without necessarily altering the 
symmetry of the central bank’s objectives.
Perhaps Alan Blinder (1998) had himself come to a conclusion similar to 
the one suggested by this chapter because in the year following his plea quoted in 
the Introduction he wrote “Sceptics often object to certainty equivalence on the 
grounds that...there is no particular reason to think that the objective function is 
quadratic...[but] policy makers almost always will be contemplating changes in policy 
instruments that can be expected to lead to small changes in macroeconomic variables, 
For such changes...any convex objective function is approximately quadratic”.
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As to future research, there may be considerable interest in exploring the 
implications of the results when the long-run mean and the inflation target are allowed 
to gradually coincide under some process of learning. To do so, the next step is to 
incorporate our results in a more realistic setting with agents whose expectations 
about inflation influence actual inflation outcomes. In addition, we might suggest at 
least three other possible uses of asymmetric loss functions: in the field of examining 
non-quadratic adjustment costs, for example, in models of investment; applications 
in explaining the excess returns in financial markets (i.e. that prices of assets may 
be biased); and finally, with respect to the maintenance of fixed exchange rate zones, 
where there is large asymmetry in the policy makers preferences at either limit of the 
exchange rate band.
Chapter Two 117
A P P E N D IX  A
The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion for this LINEX loss function is 
(we take the positive value of the second over the first derivative for x  < 0  and the 
negative value for x > 0 ):
r i M -  7 exp (7*) 
exp (71) — 1 ’
This coefficient has the property that there is risk neutrality at x  =  0 and that 
r'A{x) > 0 and rA(x) < 0 for x ^ 0.
The expectation of the following LINEX function:
L(ir; 7r) =  exp [ 7 (tt — 7r) ] — — 7r) — 1
is given by:
E7rL(?r; 7r) =  exp(-77r)EV exp^n) -  -  7r) -  1, (Al)
where 7f is the imphcit inflation target. Minimizing (Al) with respect to 7r yields:
7r = ^ In [En exp(77r)],
which can be evaluated analytically when ir has a normal probability density function 
(say with mean fi and variance crj). We then have:
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This in turn gives:
tt =  p -  —  (A2)
Equation (A2) tells us that the expectation of the loss function tends to move 
away from the quadratic as 7  and crj differ from zero.
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A P P E N D IX  B
We first look for the solution to the following non-linear expectation: 
Et [bt+1exp{-'ybt+1it)\
+00
= J  bt+1 exp ( - 7 bt+1it) exp
—00
+00
{bt+ 1 - b)
2  ai
db
exp ~ b t + 1 +  2  (ft -  &t+ i “  ft22a2b
dbi+l
(  - 72° l=  exp - b j i t H----— z
+00 
i?) / exp
2T
db-'t+1
= (b~ exp (~&7*t + •
This will help us to derive the optimal rule in the general case. 
Consider the following optimisation problem:
min Et { exp [7 (7r +  a (71-* -  7r) -  bt+iit +  et+\ -  7r*) ] }
it
-  Et { 7 (tt +  a (tt* -  7f) -  fct+iit +  et+i -  tt*) } -  1
subject to:
\ Z'- N\bt+i b , 0
»
em  J K°J ,  0 0
Chapter Two
The first-order condition to this problem is:
Et fah+i exp [ 7  ( tt +  a f a  -  n) -  bt+iit 4- et+i -  7r*) ]} =  7 b. 
Since bt+ 1 and et+i axe assumed to be independent, we have:
■Et{7&t+iexp[-7&m i,]} {exp [7 et+1]} =  f—  y  - rexp [ 7  (7r +  a f a  — 7T)
Evaluating the nonlinear expectations using our earlier result gives:
(E -  7 c \it) exp ( - h i t +  exp =  e x p [7 (#  +  a^ t - f
Taking logarithms delivers the final result mentioned in the main text:
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A P P E N D IX  C
The derivation of the optimal rule when preferences tend to symmetry is as follows:
lim
7 —»o
H
— T (7rt - 7 r ) +  rC71"-  7r*) +  lim
b b 7—>0
°bU \=  2  (7Ti -  7r) +  i  (tt -  7r*) -  lim ( -  -  ,
6 6 7 ^ 0  \b 2 -  6 7 <rg2t /
fl/ v l / _  O’? .
=  ^  (7Tt -  7T) +  £ ( # - * )  -
This latter expression yields the result mentioned in the main text:
H = ^  (7T* — 7T) +  -1 (7T — 7T*)
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CHAPTER THREE
Costly Collateral and
The Public Supply of Liquidity
“The potentially disruptive impact of asset price fluctuations on the 
balance sheets of financial institutions underscores the need for a highly 
capitalized and well-supervised financial system. Fragile financial systems 
have a reduced capacity for channeling funds from savers to borrowers, 
raising the cost of capital and restricting the access of innovative 
entrepreneurs to liquid funds which, in turn, hampers investment and 
economic growth.” (International Monetary Fund, 2000, pp. 127-8)
In tro d u c tio n
Credit market imperfections, resulting from informational asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders, create moral hazard and adverse selection problems that make 
lenders reluctant to lend and leave borrowers deprived from credit. Credit constraints 
disrupt the essential function of the financial system: to channel funds to those with 
the most productive investment opportunities. If this role is not performed well, the 
economy does not operate efficiently and economic growth will be hampered. One
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important way for society to deal with such problems has been to require collateral 
or net worth as a condition to the provision of finance.
The central issue explored in this chapter is that the positive role of collateral 
in alleviating informational asymmetry needs to be balanced with two potential 
complications: (i) the possibility that the seizure of collateral results in sizable 
liquidation costs and (ii) the problem that collateralization may enhance vulnerability 
to asset price volatility.
The model that we present here develops an incomplete contracting framework 
where wealth-constrained entrepreneurs cannot commit project returns since these 
axe assumed to be non-verifiable to courts. The information asymmetry creates 
an extreme form of moral hazard that makes the use of collateral a necessary 
condition for the provision of finance. However, because of costly asset liquidation, 
optimal collateralization is generally incomplete. The model illustrates the 
interaction between leverage and collateralization and shows under what conditions 
underinvestment and credit constraints occur. We also show that collateralized 
finance may be highly susceptible to interest rate shocks.
The model also addresses the impact of aggregate asset price uncertainty on 
the borrower-lender relationship. Particularly when borrowers are poorly capitalized, 
aggregate uncertainty affects the nature of the optimal contract (leading to a stronger 
degree of asset price contingency). We discuss the case where banks are also poorly
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capitalized and show how aggregate uncertainty may amplify the extent to which 
wealth-constrained entrepreneurs are deprived from credit.
Furthermore, we argue that there is scope for publicly supplied liquidity when 
banks face tight solvency constraints and collateral is subject to much asset price 
volatility. We will argue that the type of state-contingent government intervention 
that arises from this model may also be interpreted as countercyclical monetary policy.
We conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of a number of policy-related 
applications of the model. It is argued that our framework may be used to study the 
desirability of interest rate smoothing and to provide micro-foundations for second- 
generation currency crisis models.
How does our contribution relate to the literature? There is a large body of 
research that has focused on the microeconomic role of collateral in alleviating moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems. A common theme of this literature is that 
collateral requirements lower the hurdle to external finance by limiting the loss of the 
lender in the case of default. In the presence of adverse selection, collateral may be 
used by lenders to sort borrowers according to their risk profile. Borrowers with a 
high default probability reveal themselves by rejecting contracts with low loan rates 
and high collateral requirements. As a result, high risks pay a higher loan rate and 
are not required to put down any collateral. Low risks put down collateral but pay a 
lower loan rate (see, for example, Bester, 1985).
Chapter Three 128
If moral hazard is the concern, collateral may serve as an incentive device that 
motivates borrowers to behave diligently. In this context, Boot, Thakor and Udell 
(1991) study the relation between collateral and borrower risk in the presence of a 
repossession cost. The availability of collateral in their paper is taken as exogenous. 
Our work corresponds most closely to this branch of thinking. We assume an extreme 
form of moral hazard, enabling the borrower to divert all of the project returns in 
the case of success. A major difference however is that we deviate from the constant 
project size assumption that is common in this literature. This enables us to study 
the consequences of moral hazard and liquidation costs for the optimal or, if credit- 
constrained, feasible scale of operation. Hart and Moore (1994) develop a theory of 
debt that is also based on an extreme moral hazard problem. They assume that the 
entrepreneur-borrower has special skills (so that he cannot be costlessly replaced) and 
that he can credibly threaten to repudiate the contract by withdrawing his human 
capital. As a result, project returns will be perfectly divertable. In contrast, our 
model derives the divertability of returns from the assumption that returns are not 
verifiable to courts. A further difference is that the Hart-Moore set-up is entirely 
deterministic, whereas our model addresses the consequences of uncertainty about 
the value of collateral for the ex ante design of the optimal contract.
Recently, a growing body of research has emerged on the macroeconomics 
of collateral. This new literature has studied how collateral (and net worth) 
requirements, as a result of microeconomic credit market imperfections, may make the
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macroeconomy more vulnerable to unanticipated shocks. One branch of research has 
focused on aggregation problems, showing how the financial sector may lose its ability 
to aggregate, and efficiently reallocate, resources in response to a shock. Holmstrom 
and Tirole (1997, 1998) show how shocks may lead to credit rationing when financial 
intermediaries face a moral hazard problem or when the aggregate collateral of private 
agents does not satisfy their liquidity needs. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1999) 
introduce a distinction between domestic and international collateral and show how 
the aggregate insufficiency of international collateral may cause financial turmoil.
A second branch of research has focused on level problems associated with 
shocks. The level of borrowing, or the degree of leverage, may become highly 
susceptible to shocks that either directly or indirectly affect the value of collateral 
or net worth. This branch of research has shown that small shocks may lead to 
persistent and amplified business cycle fluctuations. In a seminal article, Bernanke 
and Gertler (1989) develop a framework where endogenous procyclical movements in 
net worth magnify investment and output fluctuations. An income-accelerator effect 
on investment emerges as income increases relax borrowing constraints. Kiyotaki 
and Moore (1997, 1999) construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with flow 
and stock effects on credit-constrained entrepreneurs. Not only does higher profit 
alleviate credit constraints in the future, but the resulting asset price response 
also magnifies the degree to which credit constraints bind today. Our model fits 
into this line of research. We also focus on level problems linked to collateralized
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external finance. A major difference, however, concerns the fact that our contribution 
highlights the role of bank balance sheets in constraining the ability of entrepreneurs 
to find project finance. Unlike previous work, we link the nature of the optimal 
contract to the interaction between the balance sheets of banks and the degree of 
asset price uncertainty. It is this interaction that leads to a further tightening of 
credit constraints, creating scope for welfare-enhancing policy intervention.
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1. A  M odel o f Costly Asset Collateralization
The purpose of this section is to set up a framework where collateral requirements 
emerge as an element of an optimal loan contract between banks and entrepreneurs. 
The model addresses both benefits and costs associated with the use of collateral. On 
the positive side, collateral requirements reduce problems of asymmetric information. 
In this model, collateral serves as incentive device that eliminates the desire of 
borrowers to strategically default. On the negative side, collateral requirements also 
create a number of independent problems. One complication that we explore in this 
section is the fact that liquidation of collateral is typically costly.
The model identifies productive assets as the source of collateral. Assets serve 
both as security against loan default and as input in the process of production. The 
borrower in this model wants to be leveraged to reach the optimal scale of operation. 
Leverage and asset collateralization are mutually reinforcing. Higher leverage expands 
the asset base of the borrower that can be collateralized. Higher collateralization 
contributes to loan security and thereby creates the very possibility of leveraging.
We first discuss the basic model. We then revisit the welfare effects of the 
crucial assumptions of the model. To conclude, we examine a number of implications 
of the model, namely underinvestment, credit constraints and the susceptibility of 
the optimal contract to interest rate shocks.
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1.1. The Basic Set-Up
Consider an economy that is populated with a continuum of identical risk neutral 
banks and entrepreneur-borrowers. The representative bank competes for loans and 
deposits in a perfectly competitive market. Bank loans are assumed to be the 
entrepreneur’s only source of external finance. Banks have access to an abundant 
supply of funds at the riskless net rate r. As a result, (i) the net return to depositors 
equals r, (ii) the expected profit of the entrepreneur-borrower is maximized subject 
to break-even and informational constraints and (iii) the expected profit of the bank 
equals zero.
The entrepreneur has access to a risky productive technology. An 
entrepreneur with asset base of size k can start a project at date 0  that returns 
Rk  at date 1 where R — R  in the case of success and R  =  0 in the case of failure. 
Throughout we assume that R  is large. The probability of success is given by p. Assets 
in this economy could refer to durables such as land, project returns to nondurables 
such as fruit. We take nondurables as the numeraire and denote the relative price at 
times 0  and 1 by q$ and q\. Operation of the project is subject to a utility cost given 
by ck2/ 2  (with c > 0). The utility cost is also expressed in terms of the numeraire.
The entrepreneur is wealth-constrained. He is endowed with an asset base of 
size w which does not enable the maximum possible extraction of surplus from the 
productive technology he has access to. The entrepreneur therefore wants to leverage
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the scale of production by borrowing from the bank. If the optimal project size is k, 
the entrepreneur needs to finance a purchase of k — w assets by borrowing a sum of 
b = q0(k — w). The fraction of the asset base that is externally financed is denoted 
by /  =  (k — w) /k  with 0 < /  < 1. Autarky corresponds to /  =  0 with 6 =  0  and 
k =  w. Full external finance corresponds to /  =  1 with 6 =  qQk and w =  0.
Two critical assumptions affect the nature of resource transfers in this 
economy between banks and entrepreneurs.
A1 (Incomplete Contracts). Returns R are not verifiable to courts.
This assumption motivates why contracts cannot be written contingent on the 
realization of the productivity shock. Since R  is not verifiable to courts, returns 
cannot be pledged in the case of success. This assumption creates a role for an 
incentive device such as the security of collateral.
A2  (Cost of Specificity). Asset liquidation is costly.
A cost of specificity arises in the valuation of the asset. It is assumed that the inside 
value of the asset exceeds its outside value. This wedge is measured by 1 — /? with 
0 < (3 < 1 and referred to as the liquidation cost. Such a cost may arise, for example, 
due to limited asset redeployability (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) or due to inefficiencies 
associated with the transfer of ownership (e.g. as a result of bankruptcy costs). This 
assumption identifies a cost for the provision of incentives.
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The optimal contractual arrangement between bank and entrepreneur 
maximizes the social surplus in this economy. The contract will specify (i) the degree 
of leverage, (ii) the net loan rate and (iii) the degree of asset collateralization. The 
degree of leverage determines asset base k given an endowment of w. The net loan rate 
is denoted by a and determines what the entrepreneur is expected to voluntarily repay 
out of the non-verifiable returns of the project. The degree of asset collateralization 
is denoted by 7  (with 0  < 7  < 1) and determines the fraction of the asset base which 
the bank is entitled to seize if the entrepreneur defaults. At time 0 , the entrepreneur 
receives a sum of b = qo(k — w). At time 1 , the entrepreneur repays (1  +  a)b. If 
the entrepreneur defaults, the bank liquidates 7  of the asset base yielding fijq ik  in 
proceeds.
The problem to solve is then given by: 
max p (R  + qi)k -  p ( l  +  a) q0(k -  w) +  (1 -  p) (1 -  7 ) q^k
k,a,j
- ( l  +  r )® > u ; -  ( 1 )
subject to
(1  +  a) qo{k - w )  < P'yqik ,
p (1  +  a) q0(k -  w) +  ( l - p ) P y q i k  > (1  + r)q0( k - w )  ;
p ( R  + qi)k -  p ( l  + ot) qo(k — w) +  (1 -  p) (1 -  7) qxk
c c- ( l  + r)qQw -  - k 2 > (pR + qi)w -  (1 + r)q0w -  -w 2 > 0,
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where the constraints are respectively the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint of 
the enrepreneur and the individual rationality (IR) constraints of the bank and the 
entrepreneur. Implicit there are two other constraints: (i) the loan rate repayment 
should not exceed R  and (ii) the degree of collateralization should not exceed unity. 
We assume throughout that the first condition is always implicitly satisfied (this 
requires R  to be sufficiently large). For the moment, we also assume that the second 
condition is satisfied. We will revisit the collateral constraint at the end of this section.
The maximand expresses the expected utility of the entrepreneur obtained 
under a contract with parameters (k, a, 7 ) and consists of the following components. 
In the case of success, the entrepreneur earns the return, keeps the asset and repays the 
loan. In the case of failure, the entrepreneur earns no return and keeps the part of the 
asset base that is not collateralized. The entrepreneur also foregoes the opportunity to 
earn the riskless rate on his endowment and incurs operational costs ck2/ 2. Because of 
the non-verifiability of returns, the entrepreneur could always strategically default and 
claim failure in the case of success. The IC constraint rules out this possibility. The 
value of the outstanding debt can never exceed the value of liquidated collateral to the 
bank, otherwise the entrepreneur would be able to renegotiate a lower loan rate. The 
IR constraint of the bank requires that the expected revenue from loan-making covers 
the cost of deposit-taking. The sources of income are loan repayment (1 +  a) qo(k—w) 
and liquidation proceeds P'yqik. The IR constraint of the entrepreneur requires 
signing the contract to be at least as profitable as remaining in autarky. Of course,
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for the entrepreneur to invest in autarky, production must be more profitable than 
depositing the endowment.
Since the supply of funds is perfectly elastic at r, competition among banks
drives the expected return from a loan down to the cost of borrowing. The bank’s IR
constraint therefore binds and, after rearranging, we obtain:
l  + r A —pqi k
1 +  a  = --------- p -----------7 - ------ (2 )
p p qo k — w
1 + r a 1 — P 9i T P p JP P Qof
where qi/qo is the gross capital gain and 7 / /  is termed the degree of relative 
collateralization. This latter ratio measures the extent to which collateralization 
exceeds the fraction of external finance and is an important determinant of the cost of 
external finance. Substitution of (2) into the maximand yields the following problem:
max (pR +  qi)k -  (1 +  r)qQk - ( l - p ) ( l -  (3)yqik -  ^ k2 , (3)
subject to the IC and IR constraints of the entrepreneur. Prom this formulation it 
is clear that the use of collateral ( 7  > 0) as an incentive device is costly. Therefore, 
no more collateral will be used than is necessary to provide incentives. Thus, the IC 
constraint binds and determines the optimal degree of collateralization:
(1  +  a) q0 (k -  w)
7  = P qi k
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Substituting this into (2 ) gives a = r. As a result, we have
,  <1 + r l % ( ± ^ L  (4)
P 9i k
7 =  (1 +  »•) go 
/  /3 9i'
This latter expression has the following interpretation: interest rate increases,
asset price depreciation and costly liquidation all lead to larger fraction of the 
entrepreneur’s equity stake being at risk.
Substituting (4) into (3) leads to the following problem:
max (pR  +  qi)k -  (1 +  r)q0k -  —— 1 +  T\ 0{k -  w) -  | k 2 ,
k p  Z
subject to the entrepreneur’s IR constraint. We will from now assume that external
finance is not too costly so that the entrepreneur’s IR constraint will not be violated. 
The optimal contract can then be characterised by:
pR + q i - ( l  + r)q0 (1  - p ) (  1 -  (3) (1  +  r) q0k* =
(3c
.  * _ol =  r
* =  (! +  r) g0 (k* -  w)
^  (3 qi k*
Substituting k*, a* and 7 * into the entrepreneur’s objective function (1 ) yields
W- =  1  ( p f l  +  g i - ( l  +  r)g0-  ( 1 ~ p) (1~ ^ ) ( 1 + r ) g 0 )
+  (1 - p)(1 ~ /?) (1 +  r )goW.
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1.2. Welfare Implications
Non-verifiability of returns and costly asset liquidation are the crucial features of the 
environment we studied. To examine their welfare implications, we now look at what 
the world would look like if these assumptions did not hold.
If returns were verifiable, it is obvious from (3) that the optimal contract does 
not involve asset collateralization. The distortionary cost of collateral liquidation 
could be avoided by relying entirely on loan rate repayment. Consequently, the scale 
of production equals its first-best level. From (2) it follows that the loan rate would 
include a default premium. The optimal contract can thus be summarized by:
=  pR  + qi -  (1 4- r)q0 
c
1 +  ra  = ---------- 1
P
7 =  0.
Welfare equals the first-best level and is given by:
w  = ^ { p R  + q i - {  14- r)q0)2 .
If asset liquidation were not costly, loan rate repayment and collateral 
liquidation are perfect substitutes. Changes in the degree of collateralization in 
that case would no longer lead to changes in welfare. The optimal contract in this
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environment is then given by:
k =  pR + q i - ( l  + r)qQ 
c
a — r
„  , _ n  9o (k -  w)
7  =  (1 +  r ) ^ ^ ^ -
Welfare again equals its first-best level.
If asset liquidation were not costly and returns were verifiable, the first 
best would again obtain but the loan rate and degree of collateralization would be 
indeterminate.
1.3. Underinvestment and Credit Constraints
One implication of the model is that non-verifiability, in conjunction with costly asset 
liquidation, leads to underinvestment compared to the first-best economy:
k * < P R  +  gi ~  (1 +  r )go 
c
Note that the liquidation cost has a non-linear effect on production. This is caused 
by two interacting forces. On the one hand, because of the zero profit condition of 
the bank, the ultimate burden of the liquidation cost falls on the entrepreneur. The 
higher the liquidation cost, the more the entrepreneur will loose per unit of collateral 
in the case of default. On the other hand, a higher liquidation cost necessitates the
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bank to require more collateral so that the proceeds from liquidation remain constant. 
It is these two reinforcing mechanisms that make the entrepreneur want to decrease 
external borrowing.
When we interpret the liquidation cost as a metaphor for weak contractual 
enforcement, the previous finding relates to the observation made by Krishnamurthy 
(1999) that collateral is likely to be scarcer in less developed economies. Using a simple 
measure of financial aggregate collateral (the ratio of domestic credit to GDP), he 
finds values of 0.4 for less developed economies such as India or Turkey and 1.25 for 
more developed economies such as UK or USA. This can be explained by the following 
circular problem. On the one hand, weak enforcement complicates the writing of 
contracts. As a result, the use of collateral is more desirable. On the other hand, 
weak enforcement also leads to a reduced supply of collateral. If property rights, for 
example, are not respected, not even land may qualify as collateral.
Another, potentially more harmful, implication is that some agents will be 
credit-constrained, in the sense that projects with positive net present value will not 
be fully funded. In the context of this model, non-verifiability is a necessary condition 
for credit constraints. Given that returns are non-verifiable, a high liquidation cost 
makes it more likely that some agents with limited endowments will be credit-rationed. 
To see this, note that the upper bound on the degree of collateralization (7 max) is 
unity. This derives from the assumption that only assets can be credibily committed 
as a security. Recall that the entrepreneur’s binding IC constraint and the bank’s
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binding IR constraint imply:
(1  +  r) q0(k - w )  = P^qik.
As a consequence, for a given degree of leverage, high interest rates, high liquidation 
costs or depreciating asset prices must be compensated for by stronger collateral 
requirements. Otherwise the entrepreneur cannot be motivated to repay in the case 
of success and the bank would not be able to break even. However, it is possible that 
the required collateral requirement hits its upper bound:
(1  +  r) gp (k -  w) =  =
P  9 i  k 1
If this is the case, the bank reduces its exposure in order to break even. The maximum 
fraction of external finance consistent with the bank breaking even is given by:
=  (fcmax ~ W) =  0  gx
fcmax 1 + rg o '
Whether or not the entrepreneur is credit-constrained is determined by the following 
lower bound on his endowment:
wm[n = ( l - - @ — ? ± )k M 
\  1 +  rqoJ
=  ( i -  & Qi\ f pR  +  < l i - ( l  +  r)qo P){ l  +  r)q0
)l  + rqoj  \  c Pc
If w > wmm, the entrepreneur will not be credit-constrained. He can borrow 
b = q0(k* — w) and achieve his preferred scale of production k*. However, if w < wmin,
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the entrepreneur will be credit-constrained with the scale of production equal to:
9 o - / W ( l  +  r ) ’
The effect of liquidation costs on the minimum endowment requirement is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, costly liquidation lowers the desired production scale for 
the unconstrained entrepreneur. This lowers the minimum endowment requirement. 
On the other hand, costly liquidation reduces the maximum possible degree of leverage 
for the constrained entrepreneur. It may thus be possible that an increase in the 
liquidation cost makes external finance so expensive that the entrepreneur is no longer 
credit-constrained. In this case, the entrepreneur simply chooses to borrow less.
1.4. Susceptib ility  to  In te rest R ate  Shocks
Let us now examine the response of production to an increase in the riskless rate. 
The prediction implied by this framework is that small changes in r  may have large 
consequences when liquidation costs are substantial. To see this, note that
dk*(r;(3)
dr
d ( pR  +  gi -  (1 +  r)q0 (1 -  p )(l -  j3) (1 +  r) q0
c
is decreasing in the liquidation cost.
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The intuition that drives this result is as follows. As the cost of funds 
increases, the bank needs to raise more revenue. However, the possibilities of 
raising revenue are restricted. Due to the non-verifiability of returns, the bank is 
forced to equalize revenue across realizations of the productivity shock. The IC 
constraint dictates equality between loan rate repayment and collateral liquidation 
proceeds. Therefore, in order to boost revenue without compromising incentives, 
collateralization must increase. And, the more costly collateral liquidation is, the 
more strongly collateralization needs to be increased. This in turn motivates the 
entrepreneur to reduce the scale of production more drastically.
Due to costly collateral liquidation, interest rate changes have powerful effects 
on the feasibility of the optimal contract. Especially when liquidation costs are high, 
a small increase in the interest rate may violate the entrepreneur’s IR constraint as 
leveraging becomes too costly. Collateral is beneficial as an incentive device but at 
the same time makes the feasibility of the contract more susceptible to changes in 
interest rates.
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2. Aggregate Uncertainty
The previous section examined the optimal contractual arrangement between banks 
and entrepreneur-borrowers. It was shown how non-verifiability and costly asset 
liquidation necessarily lead to the bank breaking even whatever the realization of 
the productivity shock. Due to the non-verifiability assumption, the proceeds from 
collateralization must be at least as much as those from loan rate repayment. Due to 
the costly asset liquidation assumption, this weak inequality turns into an equality. 
Therefore, regardless of idiosynchratic uncertainty about the productivity of the 
project, banks always break even in this economy.
This section revisits the optimal contract in an environment with aggregate 
asset price uncertainty. Depending on the contractual form, banks may no longer 
break even in every possible state of the world. An issue of particular interest is 
the interaction between credit constraints and the optimal contractual form under 
aggregate uncertainty.
Aggregate uncertainty is introduced as follows. We assume that, for exogenous 
reasons, the date-1  asset price equals qn in the good state of nature and qi, in the bad 
state (with qn > <?l). The good state occurs with probability n and the bad state 
with probability 1 — ir. Let q\ =  nqn +  (1 — 7r)qi, which is the expected asset price 
as of date 0 .
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2.1. Contracting under A ggregate U ncertainty
We are looking for a contract between bank and entrepreneur that specifies (i) the 
degree of leverage (determined by k), (ii) the net loan rate in the good and the bad 
state (an  and 0 7 ,) and (iii) the degree of asset collateralization in the good and the 
bad state ( j H and 7 L).
The problem to solve is given by:
max 7r [ p (R +  qH) k -  p ( l  + a H) q0(k -  w) +  (1 -  p) (1 -  ^ H) qHk ]
k ,< * H ,< X L r(H n L
+  (1 -  tt) [p (R +  qL) k — p  (1 +  a L) q0(k -  w) +  (1 -  p) (1 -  7 J  qLk] 
-  (1 + r)qQw -  | k2
subject to the incentive constraints for the good and the bad state (ICh and ICl):
(1 +  ocH) q0(k - w )  < P lHqHh ,
(l + aL)q0( k - w ) < £ 7 LqLk ,
the IR constraint of the bank:
7r [p{l  + a H)q0{ k - w )  +  (1 -  p) PnfHQHk ]
+  (1 - t t )  [p( l  + a L) q o ( k - w)  + [ l - p ) P l LqLk] 
> (14-r)q0( k - w ) ,
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and the IR constraint of the entrepreneur:
7r [ p (R +  qH) k -  p ( l  + a H) qo(k - w )  +  (1 -  p) (1 -  j H) qHk ]
+  (1 - 7 r ) [ p ( R  + qL) k  -  p  (1 +  a L) q0{k -  w) +  (1 -  p) (1 -  7 l ) qLk ]
-  (l + r)q0w -  | k2
Q
> (pR + qi)w -  (1 + r)qoW -  - w 2 > 0.
Note that there are now two incentive constraints (ICr and ICl) to ensure 
that strategic default is prevented in both states of nature. Since collateral liquidation 
is costly, we know that the optimal contract will economize as much as possible on 
the use of collateral. ICr and ICl will therefore both be binding. Due to competition 
the bank’s IR constraint will also be binding. Substituting the IC constraints into 
the bank’s IR constraint yields:
H<lHk) +  ( l-7 r ) ( /? 7 LqLk) =  (1 +  r) q0(k -  w ) . (5)
We explore two types of contract that may emerge from this problem: a 
contingent contract and an uncontingent contract. In both cases we restrict attention 
to renegotiation proof contracts. We show that both types of contract lead to the 
same welfare level. For the moment, we also restrict attention to the case where the 
collateral constraint does not bind. Binding collateral constraints will be discussed 
in the next section.
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2.2. Contingent Contract
State-contingency in this context refers to dependence of the entrepreneur’s liabilities 
on the state of nature. This means that the loan rate and/or the value of the 
collateralized asset base depend on the realization of the asset price. In other words, 
OiH and cxl may differ from each other and so may 7 Hqn and 7 LqL.
Without loss of generality, we focus on the case where =  7L =  7.37 From 
(5) it then follows that
_  (1  + r) g0 (k -  w)
7  P qi k
where qi =  7xqH +  (1 — 7r )^ .
Using this latter expression as well as the binding IC constraints, the problem 
can be written in the following convenient way:
max (pR +  qi)k -  (1 +  r)qQk -  —— +  ^ qo{k -  w) -  , (6 )k fj 2
subject to the entrepreneur’s IR constraint. Note that this expression coincides with 
what we derived in the absence of aggregate uncertainty. The only difference is that 
qi now refers the expected date 1 asset price. If the entrepreneur’s IR constraint is 
not violated, the optimal contingent contract (among the contracts that we focus on)
37 Alternative state-contingent contracts where the degree of collateralization does depend on the 
asset price result in exactly the same level of welfare.
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is characterised by:
pR +  qx -  (1 +  r)q0 (1 -  p)( 1 - /? ) ( !  +  r) g0
Pc
k =
c
a// =  (1 +  r) —  — 1
Qi
oll =  (1 +  r) — -  1
Qi
(1 +  r) g0 ~l H  =  7 i  =
The level of welfare is the same as if there were no aggregative uncertainty:
W  =  1  ( pR +  ft -  (1 +  r)go -  (1 ~  p)(1 ~ ®  (1 +  f) g0 )
+ ( l - P) ( l -^ ) ( l  + r)goW
Note that the contingent contract results in bank profit variability. The bank now 
makes a profit in the good state and a loss in the bad state.
2.3. Uncontingent Contract
The state-uncontingent contract insulates the liabilities of the entrepreneur from asset 
price volatility. This is achieved by setting a #  =  Of, =  a  and 7 Hqn =  7 lQl - From 
(5), we can derive j H and 7 L. Note that 7 ^  < 7 L since qH > Ql - Again, it turns out 
that the objective function can be conveniently rewritten as (6 ). If the entrepreneur’s
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IR constraint is not violated, the optimal uncontingent contract is characterised by:
=  pR  +  qi -  (1 +  r)q0 (1  -  p)( 1 -  P) (1 +  r) g0 
c pc
&h = &l = r
(1 +  r) q0 (k -  w)/-y   % ^ ^ ^  '
7h P qa  k
(1  +  r) q0 (k -  w)
7 i  =
The level of welfare is again the same as in the case without aggregative 
uncertainty. Note that the uncontingent contract does not cause bank profit 
variability. Collateral requirements vary countercyclically with asset prices so that 
stable revenue is maintained across states of nature.
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3. Credit Constraints, Bank Solvency and The Public Supply of Liquidity
The previous section identified costly asset liquidation as a first complication for the 
provision of finance. We now study a second complication: contracts with collateral 
clauses introduce relative price risk. Aggregate uncertainty about collateral values 
may under certain conditions be a source of credit constraints. We will establish 
that aggregate uncertainty may be particularly troublesome when both banks and 
borrowers axe poorly capitalized. We will also identify a role for the public supply of 
liquidity.
3.1. Credit Constraints under Aggregate Uncertainty
We now examine the consequences of aggregate uncertainty for agents that are credit- 
constrained. Consider first the uncontingent contract. Since the credit-constrained 
entrepreneur will want to be leveraged to the maximum possible extent, the degree 
of collateralization hits its upper bound. In the presence of aggregate uncertainty, 
this upper bound binds in the bad state of nature. This is because the uncontingent 
contract requires a higher degree of collateralization when the asset price is low. As 
a result, we have
_  (1 4 - r) q0 (k -  w)
lH (3 Qh k
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and
=  (1 +  r) q0 ( k - w )  =
7 i 0 k 
The latter condition will pin down the feasible scale of production:
_ _ q o w _ _
< 7 o -/W (l +  r ) ’
which is lower than in the case without aggregate uncertainty since < <7i-
In contrast, the contingent contract does not require the degree of 
collateralization to vary countercyclically. The contingent contract we studied before 
simply sets = 1l — 7- Maximum collateralization implies:
1h =  7 l  =  1>
leaving the feasible scale of production unchanged at:
h _  Qqw
Qo- Pqi/(l  +  r)'
In sum, the equivalence of welfare between the contingent and uncontingent 
contract breaks down when the entrepreneur is credit-constrained. Since the degree of 
leverage is not affected by asset price volatility, the contingent contract now dominates 
the uncontingent contract.
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3.2. Bank Solvency under A ggregate U ncertainty
We axe now ready to examine the consequences of bank solvency constraints for the 
provision of external finance to credit-constrained entrepreneurs. We show that bank 
solvency considerations affect the nature of contracting by limiting the degree of asset 
price contingency and thereby creating an independent source for credit constraints.
Let <j> denote the capital-to-assets ratio of the representative bank in this 
economy. Solvency requires that the losses in the bad state of nature do not exceed 
the bank’s net worth:
<j>{ 1 +  r)q0(k -  w) > (1 +  r)q0(k -  w) -  PqL^ Lk
or
pQLlLk > (1 -  0 ) ( 1  +  r)q0(k -  w).
Bank solvency considerations will come into play when asset price volatility 
is high relative to the bank’s net worth. The precise condition under which bank 
solvency will matter is given by:
<  G + u - i J q" ■ ( 7 )
If this condition holds, then financing a credit-constrained entrepreneur up to scale 
k =  qoU)/(qo — Pqi/(l +  r)) will push the bank into insolvency in the bad state of
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nature. To see this, note that pqLlL^ < (1 — ^)(1 H~ r)<Zo(fc — tu) =  (1 — for
7 L =  1 and qL < (1  -  (j))qi.
If condition (7) holds, the solvency constraint binds and can be rewritten as:
1 - f c - a - a 1 T i n r -  (8)
Substituting the latter expression into the bank’s binding IR constraint,
k  uj
* ( fh  hQh) +  (1 — tt) (/3? i7 L) =  (1 +  r )  9 0 — T— ,
yields the optimal degree of collateralization in the good state of nature:
Ql (  <t> ,
From (8 ) we can derive the optimal project size:
k s = ___________WH___________
? o - / W K 1 - 0 ) ( 1 +  r)] '
Another way to determine whether the solvency condition binds is in terms
of the capital-to-asset ratio. Let
_ *(<ih -  qi>)
<}l +  ir(qH -  9l ) ’
with 0 <(/>*< 1. We can then summarize our results as follows. If <j) =  0, the bank 
has no capital cushion and cannot afford to suffer any losses resulting from asset 
price depreciation. The optimal contract therefore corresponds to the uncontingent
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contract and the project size will equal:
f c =  qoW
g o - / W ( 1 +  r )
If 0 < <j> < (j>*, the bank can withstand a certain degree of asset price volatility 
but still has to reduce its exposure in order to survive in the bad state of nature. The 
optimal contract corresponds to a contingent contract with =  1 . The scale
of operation is given by:
* =  9oW
[ ( l - ^ ) ( l  +  r ) ] '
If (j) > (fi*, the bank is immune to the asset price volatility in this economy 
and the optimal contract corresponds to a contingent contract with = 7 L =  1 . 
The project size equals:
jl -  <tiw
0o-/3gi/(l + r) ’
These results can also be more generally related to agents that are initially not 
credit-constrained. If the uncontingent contract remains feasible given a particular 
degree of asset price volatility, then bank solvency constraints are irrelevant. If the 
uncontingent contract is not feasible for that degree of asset price volatility, then 
credit constrants occur depending on the extent of bank capitalization.
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3.3. T he Public  Supply of L iquidity
The combination of poor bank and borrower capitalization may lead to credit 
tightening in the face of aggregate uncertainty. We have shown that non-verifiability 
may produce credit constraints which in turn lead to a trade-off between high leverage 
and low bank profit variability. A credit-constrained entrepreneur in this economy 
will want to sign a contingent contract to ensure maximum leverage. At the same 
time, the contingent contract produces asset volatility that may be too high from 
the perspective of the bank. In response, poorly capitalized banks will reduce their 
exposure and this leads to a further welfare loss.
Since the uncertainty in this model is taken to be aggregate, there is no 
scope for private insurance. As a result, a role for public insurance emerges in the 
form of government supplied liquidity (as in Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998). This is 
particularly so if the environment is prone to a great deal of asset price volatility and 
if it is difficult to improve on the capitalization of banks. In the context of this model, 
the government could tax banks in the good states of nature and provide them with 
liquidity in the bad states. The extent to which the government needs to provide 
liquidity can be measured by 0 * — 0 , where 0  is the bank’s capital-to-asset ratio and 
0 * is the threshold value beyond which the solvency constraint does not bind.
This is somewhat reminiscent of the government acting as a co-signer. As 
has been highlighted by Besanko and Thakor (1987), the practice of co-signing
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serves to increase the availability of collateral. And this is exactly what credit- 
constrained entrepreneurs need. The state-contingent provision of liquidity could also 
be interpreted as countercyclical monetary policy, where monetary policy is lenient 
when asset prices are low (and liquidity needs are the highest) and monetary policy 
is tight when asset prices are high.
The beneficial role of government supplied liquidity (or, alternatively, 
countercyclical monetary policy) must be balanced with potential dangers that the 
model does not address. For example, as has been pointed out by Krugman (1998), 
Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998) and others, implicit government guarantees may 
create moral hazard problems that lead to excessive indebtedness and overinvestment. 
In addition, asset price collapse may cause a problem of regulatory forebearance. 
Governments may be tempted to compromise on regulation standards and to delay 
financial restructuring reforms. Finally, financial fragility may also undermine long­
term price stability by triggering monetary policy forebearance, that is to adopt, in 
the face of asset price collape, a looser policy stance than is justified by macroeconomic 
conditions.38
38See IMF (2000, p. 128).
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C oncluding R em arks
This chapter has highlighted two complications associated with collateral 
requirements in the provision of external finance. We have argued that costly asset 
liquidation may sharply reduce the extent to which wealth-constrained entrepreneurs 
are leveraged. We have shown that aggregate asset price uncertainty may leave 
borrowers deprived from credit when banks are poorly capitalized. Of course, due to 
the non-verifiability of returns, collateral has to be used despite the presence of such 
costs, and will be used if the entrepreneur wishes to be leveraged. As the Chinese 
proverb says, it is better to fight a candle than to curse the darkness! Finally, we 
have also suggested that state-contingent provision of liquidity by the government, 
also interpreted as countercyclical monetary policy, may be useful in the environment 
that we studied here.
We conclude with a brief discussion of two possible avenues for future research. 
We found that the degree of leverage is highly susceptible to interest rate changes 
when the liquidation is high. A first possible application of this result relates to the 
desirability of interest rate smoothing. Interest rate smoothing can be rationalized if 
there are convex adjustment costs in the scale of production. Since adjustment costs 
increase with the size of the response of production, interest rate smoothing may be 
more desirable when the cost of asset liquidation is high.
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A second application concerns the micro-foundations of second-generation 
currency crisis models. These models are based on the notion that defending a fixed 
exchange rate is a matter of trade-offs. The self-fulfilling nature of a crisis hinges on 
the requirement that the costs of defending a peg outweigh the benefits in the event 
of a speculative attack (see, for example, Obstfeld, 1986 and 1994). The implication 
of our model is that countries with high liquidation costs may be more prone to 
speculative pressure. This is because the cost of withstanding an attack in terms of 
reduced financial intermediation is much higher when the liquidation cost is high. 
Speculators who understand the increased reluctance of policy makers to raise rates 
therefore attack sooner rather than later.
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